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Abstract 
Title: Political Philosophy and Private Property: 
An evaluation of four main types of theory concerning the 
ownership and· distribution of property in a just society. 
candidate: Frances Howard 
This thesis takes as its starting point the beliefs that goverrnnent 
should be neutral be~ the conceptions of the good life of its 
citizens; that it should take as one of its forenost gOa.ls the 
maximization of their freedom, and with a tentative acceptance of the 
view that individuals have natural rights. 
It attempts to answer the following questions: 
1. Is there a natural right to property? 
2. can an individual acquire exclusive control over an object 
independently of the actions or acquiescence of others? 
3. Do private property rights infringe or protect freedom? 
4. Is equality a desirable goal? If so, what form of equality 
should a society pursue? 
5. Is a free society compatible with an egalitarian society? 
6. Does it make sense to s:peak of distributive justice? 
In answer to the first two questions the author discusses and rejects 
John locke's Labour Theo:cy of Acquisition; in resp:>nse to the others 
she discusses the theories of Karl Marx, G A Cohen, Robert ~zick, 
Michael Oakesoott, John Rawls, Alan Ryan and Ronald Ihorkin and 
attenpts conceptual analyses of "freedcrn", "equality", "justice" and 
"property". 
Finally, it is concluded that: 
1. There is no natural right to pro:perty. 
2. The form of property rights adopted requires the hypo-
thetical consent of concerned parties. 
3. Private property rights in areas of everyday contact are 
valuable - for privacy, autonomy and individuality. 
Security of property rights on a large scale, on the other 
hand, can threaten the freedom of others. 
4. Equality is desirable. Rawls's version, that no inequality 
be permitted unless it irrproves the position of the \\Orst-
off, or a variant of this, .best conforms to the constraint 
of 2. 
5. This version of equality is canpatible with freedan. 





This thesis atterrpts to answer the question of how material resources 
ought to be distributed. As it stands this fonnulation is ambiguous 
and its ambiguity obscures a major controversy. Theorists debate 
whether property should be distributed by means of one or other 
procedure or whether it should be distributed and maintained in one or 
other pattern. The issue is further complicated by the fact that 
there are different sorts of ownership (or degrees of exclusivity). 
It is a question of great significance, however, since we all need 
these resources for life, comfort, self-expression, work and 
amusement. There must be some rules governing their use since without 
rules there would be perpetual conflict and insecurity. ('lb agree to 
have no rules is to adopt a rule of a sort). These rules are sorrewhat 
like rules of the road: it is better to have and to obey any rule 
(however arbitrary) than to have no rules at all, and yet sane rules 
are better than others. 
Which rules to adopt regarding property is an important and imnensely 
controversial political issue. Peter Singer writes, "Should 
distribution by and large be left to the workings of a free market, in 
which individuals trade voluntarily, or should society as a 
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whole, through the agency of the governnent, seek to distribute goods 
and services in accordance with sorce criterion general! y regarded as 
desirable? It is this issue which is at the centre of the political 
division between right and left." (Arthur and Shaw, 1978 : 207) 
It is such a widely contested issue not merely because rrost people 
have deep and conflicting interests in what system is adopted, but 
also because it is a genuinely difficult question. It is difficult 
partly because of the problems of detennining the rights of 
individuals vis-a-vis unowned things. Do they, for instance, have a 
right to a share, a right to use any of them, or a conditional first 
oames first served right that whoever finds or uses an object first is 
entitled to exclusive control of that object. 
It is made rrore difficult by the fact that one system does not clearly 
produce rrore utility or protect freedan better than another. To 
prevent a person taking sanething from an unowned state is to limit 
his freedan. To protect him in taking and keeping it is to limit 
another's freedom. But plainly a responsible government must protect 
the action if it allows it. This is not unique in being a case where 
one person's freedom limits another's. It is controversial, however, 
in that unlike cases of assault or the expression of ideas, it does 
not fall clearly on one or the other side of the division between self 
regarding acts and acts of interference with others. 
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I have attempted to assess same of the major arguments in this debate. 
Naturally such a discussion cannot be exhaustive but I hope it is 
representative of the important positions. 
In It¥ first chapter I discuss IDCke's Labour Theory of Acquisition. 
He asserts that if one labours on a previously unowned object one 
acquires exclusive rights over it. This theory is the rrost plausible 
account of how individuals could came to acquire property without the 
acquiescence of others. If he is right, rights of ownership created 
by the labour of the possessor or by someone who freely transferred 
the object to the owner ought to be respected in all circumstances. 
If he is wrong, property rights must have received the actual consent 
or be capable of receiving hypothetical consent of sane or all other 
parties. 
It is possible to distinguish three arguments in support of this. The 
first is that this arrangerrent is necessary for the consumption and 
productive use of things. I assert on the contrary, that while it is 
necessary to allow people rights to labour on, use or consume things, 
nothing follows fran this about whether they ought to have exclusive 
control over the objects into perpetuity. This argument merges with 
two utilitarian points: that if labour gives title, land and other 
resources will be controlled by the most productive and such people 
will have an incentive to increase the general stock of resources. If 
these rights include the power to bequeath however, the land will very 
possibly pass out of the hands of the industrious and into the hands 
of ~ weak and lazy and other talented or industrious people will be 
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deprived of the opportunity of exercising their skills. 
A second argument is that labour mingles the labourer's identity with 
the object and so he acquires the same rights over it as he has over 
his person. But the absolute inviolability of one's body seems to 
rest on various facts which do not apply to objects. 
I.Dcke places two limits on the amount of property one may acquire by 
labouring. The first is that what one acquires should not go to 
waste; the second, that there should be "enough and as good" left for 
others. There is much controversy as to how the second should be 
interpreted. Nozick, who advocates a slightly mcxlified I.Dckean 
theory, says: "The crucial issue is whether others are left \\Orse 
off". 
If, as in conditions of abundance, others are left with more than they 
could possibly want or use, the labourer does them no hann in refusing 
them access to what he has improved. If they use or take it they are 
doing him an injustice since they are robbing him of the results of 
his honest labour. In conditions of scarcity, where each act of 
appropriation limits the choices of others, Becker and Nozick attempt 
to rescue I.Qcke. Since the labour improves the value of the land the 
labourer may deserve the equivalent of 'What he has produced. However, 
it makes a difference 'Whether what others are left is money and food 
(as wages) or land to develop and appropriate. If they are paid out 
in wages they do not have the chance to develop raw materials to their 
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full potential. 
I conclude that "private property is not necessary, nor is it natural, 
nor is it hannless". Since everyone has a right to a share or a right 
to use tmowned things, they ImlSt agree to their exclusion fran use of 
objects or to the institutions which produce exclusive rights. 
Alternatively such institutions Imlst, in sane sense, increase the 
general well-being. In the chapters which follow I assess the merits 
and demerits of a system of private property, against the criteria of 
justice, freedom and happiness. 
In Chapter II, I discuss the Marxist claim that private property is 
inimical to justice and liberty. 
The essence of capitalism is that the owners of the means of 
production are free to strike up any bargain they like and can with 
workers. Ma:rx said that this was tmjust since the worker received 
less than the value of his work and the capitalist received payment 
although he did no work. 
This accotmt relies on Marx's peculiar notion of value and a 
controversial definition of desert. rvta:rx believed that the value of a 
camm:xlity was directly proportional to the number of hours spent 
producing it. That is, the worker's wage is determined by the number 
of hours needed to prcrluce the necessities of his life, while the 
value of the ccmnodi ty he produced is detennined by the number of 
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hours he spent making it. If the capitalist can induce him to work 
for nore hours than are necessary to prcxluce his .livelihood and the 
capitalist creams off the value of these surplus hours, he exploits 
the worker. 
G.A. Cohen argues convincingly that this notion of value is incorrect. 
It certainly seems to bear no relation to the price or wage which is 
obtained. Nevertheless, the capitalist makes a profit - he would not 
invest if he didn't - and he does not work for this profit. Although 
he does not labour, his ·entrepreneurial skill, his daring and the fact 
that he coordinates a large nUmber of people and resources are 
causally responsible for increased productivity. Still, Marxists 
argue, his reward is out of prop:>rtion to his contribution. What he 
principally has to contribute is the rreans of prcxluction. If he has a 
right to these, he has a right to what they are worth. I conclude 
here that the attempt to assess the justice of capitalism seems to 
miscarry because one first has to establish what one is justified in 
bargaining with (in virtue of what one can be said to deserve a 
reward) • That is, the question of ownership seems to be antecedent to 
the question of justice. 
Cohen writes that liberals and libertarians emphasize the freedan of 
capitalism but ignore its inherent unfreedan. It is true, he writes 
that the worker is free to sell his labour but it is also true that he 
is forced to sell it. Nozick denies this. Clearly they are using 
different notions of freedom~ 
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Nozick believes that behaviour toward each person ought to be 
constrained so that he is not used for any end except as he chooses. 
This, and this alone, is a legitimate restraint on other people's 
freedom. This is contrasted with a Marxian view of freedcm, as the 
absence of restraint,· whether human or non-human and the widening of 
choice. This conception allows that individual freedcm may scmetimes 
be sacrificed if necessary to produce greater freedom for all. There 
is also a disagreerrent as to what constitutes a free society: whether 
it is a state of affairs which has been brought about by free actions 
of individuals or a society which produces and protects freedoms. 
These two notions are not necessarily coextensive unless one has a 
Jroralized notion of freedom: that one does not force saneone to do 
sanething if one acts within one's rights. I believe this definition 
to be untenable and question-begging. One requires a Jrore neutral 
notion if freedom is to be used as a criterion for judging between 
systems. 
It follows that one is scrretimes justified in forcing setteOne to do 
sanething, or in making it the case that he has to choose between 
unpalatable alternatives, e.g. to marry setteOne he does not 
particularly like or remain single. 
Property acquisition and use seems to be a slightly different case. 
To appropriate all available land and then to bargain with the 
landless is to rearrange his options in a way not unlike holding a gun 
at his head. To avoid the difficult question of property acquisition 
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Nozick attempts to show that even where original resources are 
distributed according to a pattern {he asks his opponent or reader to 
imagine his favourite pattern) liberty will upset that pattern. I 
argue that Nozick does not prove this assertion. 
Tb conclude this chapter I discuss the socialist alternative of 
collective ownership and collective decision-1Mki.ng on issues of 
production and the distribution of jobs and rewards, and conclude that 
on several counts this fails to produce or protect freedcm. It seems 
to rest on the beliefs that people can be unfree in their desires and 
beliefs and that it is right and possible to change them, in 
particular it ·is possible and right to make people love "WOrk and their 
felLow men. I find this implausible. 
Nevertheless the socialist critique of capitalist unfreedarn still 
stands. 
In Chapter III, I elaborate on same of the criticisms of collective 
ownership hinted at at the end of Chapter II, using arguments fran the 
Nee-Liberals', oakeshott, Nozick and Hayek. They agree with the 
Marxists that cornnon property is linked to a ccmnon hierarchy of ends 
but characterise this link in a different way. 
Fbr Marxists collectivization is necessary to the pursuit of major 
goals such as fraternity, efficiency and universal job satisfaction. 
Extending the prisoners' dilemna analogy, it seems to make sense that 
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each of a group can achieve nore of what he wants by acting 
collectively with others and compranising sane of his own ends. 
Oakeshott recognises the power that would be created by such 
collectivization but ·sees the threat rather than the pranise of such 
power. The source of his disagreenent is largely empirical pessimism 
- but it is an attitme which has been proved reasonable. 
Hayek and Nozick see collectivization as productive of less of what 
people want and object that although collectivization might make 
ccmron goals possible it is not the case that inembers of large groups 
like nations have conm:m goals in the way that families or churches 
sanetimes do. 
Instead of cornrron property being useful in the pursuit of cx:mocm ends, 
ccmron ends may be a prerequisite for the administration of carrron 
property. But forcing people to believe in or pursue ccmron ends robs 
them of liberty. It is desirable to allow the individual autonomy as 
far as possible, especially in matters which concern him alone. 
I conclude that private property is the best guarantee of such 
autonomy since private property rights entail a duty on the part of 
others to respect as inviolable an area around one. They also render 
one independent of others for the necessities of life and employment. 
However, insofar as this argument justifies private property it 
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justifies sane property for all, and it argues against penni tting vast 
accumulations of wealth since these represent dangerous power 
strUctures and extend the owners' powers to the freedom to manipulate 
others, which is undesirable. 
In Chapter IV, I discuss possible canpranises. These are 
utilitarianism, especially Alan Ryan's version, and the theories of 
Rawls and Ik.orkin. 
Utili tarianisrn aims at producing the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number. As regards property it is tom between the 
subordinate principles of security and equality. 
Ryan suggests praroting security by maintaining present property laws 
but stipulating that these will change in the future. This will have 
the effect of bringing about needed change without disappointing any 
actual expectations; taxing inherited wealth very harshly, but 
keeping up incentives by taxing earned wealth less harshly; and 
splitting property rights. 
Rawls rejects utili tarianisrn since it seeks to maximize the net amount 
of happiness but is indifferent to how such happiness is to be 
distributed. If it were necessary to sacrifice one individual or 
group for the sake of raising the sum of utility, the utilitarian 
would do so. Rawls objects that this is unjust and involves a 
misguided analogy with rational behaviour for an individual. In a 
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cx:mnuni ty there is no-one who experiences the net gain. There ·are 
just sane who benefit and sane who suffer. (Unlike in the individual 
there is no tmified will which consents to the suffering). 
He believes the fairest way to decide which institutions are just, 
would be to imagine a group of people choosing such institutions 
behind a veil of ignorance, that is, ignorant of their particular 
circumstances, talents, tastes and other norally irrelevant 
contingencies. Each would be prevented fran designing a social system 
to suit himself and forced to consider the possibility of being any 
kind of person. Rawls believes such persons would opt for a policy of 
"maximin", that is, choose the society in which the least advantaged 
person would be better off than he would be in any other society. 
Since no-one deserves his talents or good fortune, the well-off could 
not reasonably resent some diminution of their good luck, while the 
worse-off could be resentful if institutions were adopted which made 
them even worse-off than they might have been. 
J::M:>rkin echoes this in his notion of reasonable regret. He believes 
it is the role of goverrnrent to treat its citizens with equal respect 
and concern and that this is realised if no-one can reasonably regret 
his life. One cannot reasonably regret not being the richest, 
healthiest person alive but one can regret being worse-off than the 
average. Nor can one reasonably regret (at least one cannot hold it 
against the rest of the world) the fact that one wilfully wasted what 




equality of resources. It is unclear whether he would abandon this if· 
necessary to raise the welfare of the worst-off. To do so seems to be 
consistent with the principle of avoiding reasonable regret. Equality 
of resources is to be reckoned over time so that no-one has· reason to 
envy the entire life of another, e.g. if one person chooses to spend 
~ty years in hard, unpleasant work, he should not be grudged the 
wealth he manages to accrue. 
This is not the same as equality of opportunity. Dworkin would like 
taxation to recognise differences in effort and choice but to 
neutralize differences in talent. If this were possible to realise it 
would be a very attractive system since it would: 
(1) ·be neutral between conceptions of the good 
(2) treat people as free and responsible for their choices 
(3) solve the incentive/equality dilemna of utilitarianism 
There are problems with this as individuals must be persuaded not only 
to work hard but to work effectively and to use their rrost useful 
talents. 
I conclude the thesis with a qualified agreerrent of Rawls 1 and 
Dwoi:kin 1 s position and a very broad outline of how this would be put 
into practice. 
I attempt to justify this by showing how it reconciles the ideals of 
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equality (the version of equality I argue it is rrost reasonable to 
want) and freedan. 
Finally, I touch on the consequences this theory has for parents' and 
society's rights and duties vis-a-vis children, international 
redistribution and personal rights. 
Before I begin this discussion I feel it would be valuable to attempt 
a necessarily cursory analysis of the con~pt of property. 
WHAT IS PROPERTY? 
Property is usually considered as some kind of right to things (or 
even as the thing itself: "That's my property") but it is not clear 
what the contrast to such a right could be. In the absence of other 
beings who deserve rroral consideration, what constraints could there 
be on one's using, consuming or disposing of physical objects? The 
essence of property rights seems to be rights against others in regard 
to things. Lawrence Becker maintains that: 
II the full or liberal notion of ownership is rrost adequately 
explicated by reference to the following list of elements: 
(1) The right to possess, i.e. to exclusive phvsical control of 
" ' 
the thing o.-med 
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(2) The right to use, i.e. to personal enjoyrrent and use of the 
thing 
(3) The right to manage, i.e. to decide how and by whan a thing 
shall be used 
(4) The right to the incane, i.e. to the benefits derived fran 
foregoing personal use of a thing and allowing others to use 
it 
(5) The right to the capital, i.e. the power to alienate the 
thing and to consmne, waste, m:>dify or destroy it 
(6) The right to security, i.e. irmrunity fran expropriation 
(7) The power of transmissibility, i.e. the power to devise or 
bequeath the thing 
(8) The absence of te:rm, i.e. the indeterminate length of one's 
ownership rights" 
In addition to these rights, Becker lists the following correlative 
liabilities: 
"(9) The prohibition of ha:rmful use, i.e. one's duties to forbear 
fran using the thing in certain ways hannful to others 
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(10) The liability to execution, i.e. liability to having the 
thing taken away for repayment of a debt 
(11) Residuary characteristics, i.e. the existence of rules 
governing the reversion of lapsed ownersl'!ip." 
(Becker, 1977 18) 
These are characteristic elements of ownership but no particular one 
is necessary. (1), (3), (6) and (7) refer explicitly to other parties 
and seem to be what distinguish private property from lawful use of 
unowned or corrrcon property. · That is, the right to exclude others or 
to detennine ho.v they may use the thing, the right to pass these 
rights on to another (and to set the tenns of this transfer) and the 
right to be protected in these rights by the law. By contrast, the 
essence of comrron property is the right not to be excluded fran 
certain types of }lSe of an object. 
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CHAPTER II 
I..OCKE Is I..ABaJR THIDRY OF AC(l]ISITION 
In his discussion of property (!.Dcke: Sect. 24), IDcke takes as his 
starting point the praniss that "God, as King David says (Psalm 
CXV:16) has given the earth to the children of men, given to mankind 
in camon". He ~nders how it is possible for individuals to acquire 
exclusive control of objects if this is the case. Using two further 
pranisses of the Natural law: 
(2) that man has a right and duty to do whatever is necessary to 
preserve his life, and that 
(3) he owns his labour; 
he argues that a man can cane to own whatever (previously unowned) 
objects he labours upon. The sane Natural law sets limits on how much 
he may acquire in this way: he may only acquire, "As much as any one 
can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils ••• " (Sect 
30). He is further obliged to leave "enough and as good" for others 
(Sect 26). 1 
"Property" is the right to use an object as one pleases, to decide who 
else may use it and to pass these rights on to another. Secondly the 
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assertion that "God has given the earth to the children of nen, given 
it to mankind in conm::m", is imprecise. IDcke presumably believed 
that God owned the w::>rld and handed it over to men. When an 
individual passes control of an object to a group, t:J:eir rights 
regarding it can be one of the three following sorts: 
(1) That each has a right to an equal share of it and that each has 
no right to the share of the next; or 
(2) That all have equal rights to use all of it but not to exclude 
each other; or 
(3) They are to divide it up or organise use of it by sane decision 
procedure. 
(1) and (3) have interesting implications, but perhaps (2) is the best 
option since it makes the f~st assurrptions about the existence and 
intentions of a giver and can be accepted as the original position of 
man by one who accepts only the right of each person to act as he 
chooses as long as he does not infringe the rights of others to do the 
same. Objects do not have rights so the right to free action can 
include the right to do whatever one likes with them. 
By "labour" I.Dcke means purposeful activity which changes the nature 
or position of physical objects. This includes picking up acorns and 
building fences. It perhaps implies making the object :m::>re useful. 
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It is not clear precisely how much one may acquire by a particular act 
of labour. For instance, does labouring on one part of a thing, give 
one a right to the whole of it? 
I shall argue that there are three distinct argurrents for the 
conclusion that labour entitles one to control objects. The first is 
that private property is necessary for productive use of objects. The 
second that labour necessarily mingles the labourer's identity with 
the object, in such a way that to take it fran him against his will is 
akin to harming him physically. The third is that labour increases 
the value of the object and that the labourer deserves recanpense in 
the fonn of the object itself. 
At first sight the relevance of wcke' s argurrent may seem doubtful as 
there are very few unowned things to which questions of just 
acquisition might apply. However, IDcke addresses the questions of 
whether things can ever be owned at all, and if they can, whether 
appropriation can occur witfiout the consent of others, and what sort 
of ltmits there are on appropriation. 
If IDcke's argument is good then, since property is a natural right, 
it should be respected by rroral agents and protected by law 
irrespective of the consequences of doing so. Perhaps "irrespective" 
is too strong, as many rights are defeasible. However, one cannot be 
said to have a right unless it is guaranteed that 'it will not be 
overridden except in very extreme cases. 
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Further, if labour is a sufficient condition for appropriation, 
individuals can come to CMl1 a very great deal since what one gains by 
one's CMl1 labour can be supplemented by bequests or gifts from other's 
(they presumably had a right to give it, if they laboured on it.) 
M:>re important! y, it is possible to buy the use of someone else's 
labour. · IDcke does place two restrictions on appropriation but as we 
shall see, these two are fairly easily transcended. 
If, on the other hand, IDcke cannot establish his conclusion, this 
will have important consequences for questions of distributive 
justice. IDcke' s argument is the strongest and JTK)St coherent example 
of what may be called "the independent action" theories of property 
aPPropriation. The others such as "first occupier" theory or theories 
which describe appropriation as effected by an act of will, are 
impossible to implement because of their lack of precision, and lack 
the intuitive force of I.Dcke's theory. If his theory is false, the 
notion of a right to appropriate without the consent of others will be 
undennined. 
2 - - - - - - - - - - -
I.Dcke writes "And the condition of human life, which requires labour 
and materials to work on nf?cessarily introduces private possessions". 
(34) • 
IDcke rejects the idea that private property rights were brought into 
being by a contract in which rren consented not to interfere with the 
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possessions of others. Such an agreement would have been :impossible 
since it would have involved the convening of people fran all places 
and t:ilnes. It would not have been binding upon anyone not a party to 
it. 
It is necessary for there to be a means of appropriating individually 
because even to eat is to appropriate and if one cannot eat, one 
cannot live and if one cannot eat without the consent of others and 
such oonsent is impossible to obtain, one is forced to starve or 
steal: an absurd situation considering the plenty which has been 
provided for man (2 8) • 
Private property is necessary, not only for consumption, but also for 
effective use. "God gave the world to man in corrm:m but since He gave 
it to them for their benefit and the greatest convenience of life they 
were capable to draw from it, it cannot be supposed He meant it should 
always remain cOI"tUOn and . uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the 
industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it); not 
to the fancy or covetousness of the quarrel sane and contentious. " 
(33) 
locke seems to be irrplying that in order for it to be cultivated it 
must be appropriated. It is unclear whether this is conceptually or 
practically necessary. Anyway, in order for it to be ITOst efficiently 
used, it must be controlled by the ITOst intelligent and industrious 
and ITOtivated person. This is best ensured if labour is a necessary 
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condition for appropriation. This line of argument also supports 
extensive appropriation by one person who errploys others. I.Dcke was 
able to transcend (or avoid) the restrictions of the non-spoilage 
proviso because "as the different degrees of industry were apt to give 
man possessions in different proportions, so this invention of m:>ney 
gave them the opportunity to continue and enlarge them" (Sect. 48). 
One may exchange the useful but perishable fruits of one's labour for 
m:>ney. M:>ney does not spoil so acCUim.llations of it cannot violate the 
spoilage proviso. Nor can it be used except as a medium of exchange 
so that hoarding it up is to no-one' s "prejudice". Finally, since the 
use and value of roney are conventional, it must have been consented 
to by all who use it. 2 By extension they have agreed to the unequal 
distribution it facilitates. C B Macpherson (in The Political Theory 
of Possessive Individualism) claims that Locke believed that the 
acCUim.llation of gold quickened and increased trade and that the 
purpose of trade was to increase the wealth and power of the nation. 
This part of the argument stresses the necessity of appropriation for 
consumption, cultivation and rational use of resources. It is 
mistaken however to imagine that land cannot be cultivated or any raw 
materials improved without the sort of private property rights 
envisaged. It is conceptually possible that a person could labour on 
sanething - for the fun of it, for self-expression or in order to 
car:ry out some other project - (as when travellers hack out a path 
through a forest) without thought of keeping it. But is this a 
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practical possibility? There are two difficulties here. First, it 
may be thought to be irrp:>ssible to carry out a long-tenn project on an 
object if one has no guarantee that at no point others will interfere. 
It is impossible, it is said, for people in certain rural areas to 
grow trees since there is no private property there and no-one can be 
prevented from chopping down young trees for firewood. It does not 
follow that the only laws insuring a chance of success to such 
projects will be fully-blown property rights. One may need to allow 
individuals exclusive control of the land or object for the duration 
of the project only: or rule that certain types of interference are 
illegitimate. 
There is the further difficulty that it seems to be a rough 
psychological law that people ~rk harder if they have an ineentive. 
This is an enpirical point and one I shall deal with in detail later. 
It is not obvious, however, that full property rights are the only 
possible incentive. 
As regards Locke's second point, he does not seem to realise that 
. although the rational and industrious are encouraged to appropriate, 
many rational and industrious people are prevented by this system, 
from exercising their skills to the full, and so, from receiving 
rewards and benefitting mankind. 
The existence of rights of bequest mean that it is highly probable 
that control over large areas passes out of the hands of the strong 
and rational and into the hands of the weak and inefficient - whose 
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position is entrenched by the protection of the state. 
3 - - - - - - - - - - -
Tlx:rnas Mautner (Mautner, 1982) claims that U:>cke's account argues from 
the factual integration of self and objects to the conclusion that 
labour creates property rights. On Pg. 261 he asks, "Why should 
labour give title?" and canes up with two possible alternatives as to 
what locke intended. The first he calls "Fusion of self with object" 
(the self is extended to the object). The .argument would be: 
1. I own my labour. 
2. I mix it with an object. 
TherefOre I own the object. 
This presupposes the lli1derlying principle "that sarething which is 
joined with my own thereby becanes my own" (Pg. 261) Which has the 
consequence that I can cane to own a whole lake simply by pouring back 
· into it the water I have already drawn. Our intuitions it seans, do 
not support this liDderlying principle. 3 
The second version of the argument is "Incorporation". Here, by 
contrast, the object is drawn into the self or suum. Mautner quotes 
U:>cke: "He that is nourished by the acorn he picked up lli1der an oak, 
., 
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or the apples he gathered • • • has certainly appropriated them to 
himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishrrent is his. I ask then, 
when did they begin to be his? When he digested? Or when he ate? Or 
.when he boiled? Or when he brought them hare? Or when he picked them 
up? And it is plain, ·if the first gathering made them not his, 
nothing else could." (Sect. 27) • 
Mautner interprets this as saying that appropriation is a continuous 
process beginning with the first gathering and ending with digestion; 
labour must be the appropriative stage, since it is the first in a 
continuous process and since it would be arbitrary to draw a line at 
any {)articular point in a continuum, no line can be drawn anywhere. 
There is one stage at which it is indisputably appropriated by being 
part of the body. 
Mautner says that there is a contradiction which is caused by the fact 
that Locke fails to observe a proper fact/norm distinction. He 
establishes a fact: that there is a physical or quasi-physical merger 
between person and object and treats this as giving rise to a right. 
On Pg. 267 Mautner writes, "The same staterrent 1 labour has 
appropriative effect 1 is presented both as a conceptually necessary 
truth -when he argues for it - and as a morally necessary truth". A 
tension results: if p is conceptually necessary then not-p is 
impossible, but if p is morally necessary then not-p is not 
impossible. 
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However, the traditional problem of deriving an "ought" from an "is" 
is that of deriving a morally obligatory conclusion from factual 
premisses. I.Dcke's argument does not have wholly factual premisses. 
He asserts that one has a right to exclusive control of one's body. 
The force of the "incorporation" argument is that food becanes part of 
one's body and that it is arbitrary to draw a line in the process of 
integration except at the point where one physically removes the 
object fran the state of nature. 'Ihe idea is that there is no 
relevant difference behEen the food and the body and that, therefore 
the food takes on the moral status of the body. If we have natural 
rights to exclusive Control of our bodies, ~ have the same rights to 
exclusive control of objects we own. 
There is a different problem with this argument. Do I necessarily 
appropriate acorns if I eat them? What if I stole them? Then they 
are mine, in the sense of being part of my body, and not mine, since 
saneone else's rights to them excluded mine. Presumably one must 
presuppose as well the right to eat acorns that no-one awns. This is 
fairly tmoontroversial. It is not unoontroversial morally or 
factually that one can set in motion any "incorporative process". If 
one's ownership of aoorns rests on the fact that one will at same 
stage eat them, what sort of inoorporati ve process does one's right to 
appropriate an oil-well rest upon? There are other kinds of 
inoorporation. One can make oneself a ~en leg over which one may 
have the same rights as one has over one's natural legs. Does the 
same apply to a kidney machine? One can perhaps claim that ownership 
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of books rests on the fact that one incorporates the infonnation 
contained in them. 
SanUiel Wheeler in "Natural property rights as body rights" has 
contributed sane specular examples. He writes (Wheeler, 1980: 173) 
"Intuitively, our special rights with respect to our bodies are 
independent of· several contingencies". These are: It does not depend 
"on the relative equality or efficacy of our bodies". If one person 
~e ten times as strong as any other, that would not give others a 
right to his aid. Nor does it depend on the difficulty of transfer of 
parts; nor on the fact that "parts of the body are standardly 
attached at all or even have sensation and agent-type control; nor is 
it relevant whether we actually need a part". He says in nnst cases a 
second kidney is far less useful than a second car. So he says, if 
wooden legs have the sarre status as natural ones, why shouldn't the 
clothes "we genetically defective" humans make to replace the fur we 
lack, or the shelters we make to compensate the fact that, unlike 
turtles we do not have hanes on our backs, or the pretty jewels and 
make-up we wear to make us as attractive as peacocks, have the sarre 
status also. 4 This is all fairly bizarre, but Mautner does make the 
interesting point that one can suffer as much physical and arotional 
damage at the loss of one's ancestral hone as one does at the loss of 
a finger. 
A fundamental tenet of his argument is that having a right is not a 
matter of de<jree. One either has the right or one doesn't; and if 
• 
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there is no point at which one can draw a line between a situation in 
which one clearly has the right and a situation about which there is 
sane liDcertainty - then one has the right in the latter case as well. 
This is not obvious. Rights seem to have different degrees of 
importance. It may never be justified to kill one innocent person to 
save a number of others, but it may be justified to slap him. 
Similarly one has different rights over the different parts of one's 
body which have different degrees of irrportance corresponding to the 
number of the so-called contingent factors involved. For instance, if 
I am asleep and someone cuts off a lock of my hair I will be less 
damaged, angry or justified in taking legal action than if he takes a 
pint of my blood, and much less so than if he takes a kidney and still 
less so than it' he takes part of my brain. There are different 
degrees of irrportance and defeasibility amongst different rights: and 
different strengths of claims to a particular right. 
It remains a question whether we have a right to carry out the sorts 
of incorporation Wheeler describes. We saw, in the case of the 
acorns, that one's right to the acorns one picked up rested on the 
right to eat those acorns: but if one had stolen them - even in order 
to eat them - one would have no claim. It is not intuitively obvious 
that we have unlimited rights to self-aggrandizement. It is clear, 
therefore, that the argument which says that labour is de facto 
incorporation in the suum, and as such produces a de jure right to the 
· object laboured on, is unsound. 
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4 - - - - - - - - - - -
There is another argument to support the claim that labour gives 
title. I believe it is another argurrent and not an alternative 
inte1:pretation, because IDcke writes "Nor is it so strange as perhaps 
before consideration it may appear, that the property of labour should 
be able to overbalance the carmunity of land" (70), which suggests a 
conjtmction of arguments. He continues, "for it is labour indeed that 
puts the difference of value on everything ••• " and "I think it will be 
but a very modest canputation to say, that of the products of the 
earth useful to the life of man, nine-tenths are the effects of 
labour". 
;rt "WOuld be unfair to take away this added value especially since 
labour is usually unpleasant. Strictly speaking this argurrent 
supports a man's right to receive only the value he added and not the 
extra value of the raw materials he used. However, Locke 'WOuld 
probably reply that they were of such minimal value and are so bound 
up with the labour that it "WOuld be pointless or impossible to 
separate them. 
Lawrence Becker (Becker, 1977 : 35) points out that neither of these 
considerations applies to land, which is the subject of great 
controversy in property rights debates. Becker (Pg. 41) quotes an 
argurrent by Proudhon and a counter argurrent fran Mill which are 
relevant here. 5 Prou:llion writes, "The rich have the arrogance to 
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say 'I built this wall. I earned this land with my labour. ' Who set 
you the task we may reply and by what right do you demand payment from 
us for labour we did not impose on you?" 
Mill responds, "It is .no hardship to anyone to be excluded fran what 
others have produced: the producers were not bound to produce it for 
his use, and he loses nothing by not sharing in what otherwise would 
not have existed at all". Can this give title to what otherwise would 
have existed such as land? Locke writes " ••• he that leaves as much 
as another can make use of does as good as take nothing at all". 
(Sect 32) and "he that had as good left for his improvement as was 
already taken up needed not canplain, ought not rreddle with what was 
already improved by another's labOur; if he did, it is plain he 
desired the benefit of another's pains, which he had no right to ••• " 
(Sect 33). 
In effect, the appropriator violates no-one's rights, but his rights 
are violated if he is deprived of sanething he has laboured on. 
Locke imagines a situation of abundance where there is far more than 
the popuLation of the earth could use or reasonably desire - and 
defends property rights there. SUch a situation is very far fran oU.r 
.....orld, and from I.DCke's own. How does he move from a defence of 
private property rights in the face of abundance to defence of such 
rights in the face of scarcity? There are several different 
inte~retations. 
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C B Macpherson (Macpherson, 1962) writes that locke believes a man is 
not entitled to appropriate more than would leave "enough and as good" 
for others, i.e. that this is a necessary condition of just 
appropriation. This he calls the "sufficiency limitation". He claims 
that locke manages to .transcend it as follows: In Section 37, locke 
writes "To which let me add that he who appropriates land to himself 
by his labour does not lessen but increase the comron stock of 
mankind". He says that even the worst-off landless labourer eats and 
dresses better than. a king in a country where there is no 
appropriation. 
Macpherson constructs a plausible interpretation: That (Pg 212) "even 
if there isn't enough and as good land left for others, there is a 
good living". And although the original proviso implied that there 
ought to be enough reM materials and land left over, this can be 
overridden as it is based on a more fundanental right (to the means 
for the preservation of life) which is not violated by the revised 
proviso. "A living was what the original right guaranteed. And not 
only does appropriation leave this living - it provides it". All that 
is needed to bolster this right is the legal guarantee of the right to 
work or to be paid unemployment benefits if it is impossible to work. 
This is a plausible reconstruction but it seems to distort the picture 
which "enough and as good" suggests when it is first used. There it 
seems to mean that so much should be left that it would make no 
difference to the others whether one had appropriated or not i.e. that 
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as much should be left as others could reasonably want or use. With 
this meaning, the inclusion of the proviso makes appropriation seem 
harmless and the argt:ment for it very forceful. In Macpherson's 
reconstruction, it means only that no-one should be left so little 
that he starve. And there are no restraints on the am::runt of work he 
can be forced to do to earn this. 
It is implausible to say that he would be worse off in the wilds of 
America since although he would have no m:>re food he would certainly 
have to work less intensively (as locke says it is labour which makes 
the difference be~n the two countries). Anyway, if the labourer 
were to go to America and put in a canparable am::runt of work, he would 
be vastly better off. 
Jererey Waldron (Waldron, 1979) rejects Macpherson's reconstruction. 
He believes that locke did not intend the clause "enough and as 
good ••. " to be taken as a restriction or a necessary condition on 
appropriation, and that locke intended "other rrore stringent 
restrictions". He cites Section 31, where the spoilage proviso is 
introduced and discussed as if it were the only restriction. In 
Section 26 locke writes "For this ' labour' being the unquestionable 
property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that 
is once joined to, at least where there is enough and as good left 
over", he seems to introduce a sufficient rather than a necessary 
condition. 
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i.e. P at least where Q suggests, if Q then P rather than: if P then 
Q. 
By analogy "abortion is justified at least where the wcman has been 
raped" does not entail that it is justified only in the case of rape. 
locke knew he had a strong argument for labour's title where there was 
ab\.mdance, but that does not mean he did not intend it to create a 
title under other circumstances. Waldron says that "enough and as 
good" is not a restriction which has to be reroved. Its disappearance 
is the natural consequence of the operation of justice in acquisition 
witlx>ut the spoilage proviso. 
It seems that locke did not explicitly say that the "enough and as 
good" clause should function as a proviso, but did he imply it? 
Waldron shows that his interpretation is not inconsistent with Locke's 
fundamental premisses and that, to ~se such a proviso '\o.Uuld have 
been irrational. locke believed that a man's first duty was to 
preserve himself. "If at the dawn of tiire there hadn't been enough 
for the survival of all and if the 'enough and as good' clause 
applied, no-one would have survived. (Waldron, 1979 : 325). So, 
Waldron says the "enough and as good proviso" applied under all 
circumstances, '\o.Uuld be inccmpatible with the Natural Law. 
Waldron then denies that~ are ccmnitted to reading locke as 
pennitting accumulation of great ~alth in the face of starvation. 
locke says that the second duty of the Natural Law is to do all 
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reasonable things one can to assist the survival of others (I£>cke, 
First Treatise 88-89} and (I 42} "As justice gives every man a title 
to the product of his honest industry, and the fair acquisitions of 
his ancestors descended to him, so charity gives every man a title to 
so much out of another 1 s plenty as will keep him fran extreroo want 
where he had no rreans to subsist." 
He claims that this is a rrore stringent proviso since it applies' to 
property which is already owned and does not just restrict initial 
aCXJ.Uisi tion of property. It comes into operation, however, only in 
cases of "extreme want" and although it seems likely that this is what 
IDcke rreant, it remains true that the plausibility of the first part 
of IDcke 1 s argunent rests on the idea that no-one is made "WOrse off by 
property rights~ and that in the situations described by both 
Macpherson and Waldron, :people are decidedly "WOrse-off ~ they "WOuld 
otheJ:Wise have been. 
5 - - - - - - - - - - -
LaWrence Becker suggests that perhaps the claim "labour has an 
appropriative effect" is supposed to be taken as axiomatic - a 
ground-floor rroral claim. (Becker, 1977 : 49) He shows that this is 
unreasonable, but that there is another, closely related notion which 
does have this ground-floor quail ty. This is the notion of desert, or 
the claim that people deserve something for their labour. Becker 
writes "To ask whether desert is intelligible is to call into question 
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the whole enterprise of passing nora! judgment" (49) and to do this in 
turn, would be to call into question the notion that people are 
responsible for their actions, and that soma actions are good and 
others are bad: assumptions without which there can be no norality. 
He says the basis for the desert is 
1. One's own deeds or character. 
2. Sanething which is not norally irnpennissible. 
3. Scmething which is over and above what it is one's duty to do. 
4. Sanething which adds value to the lives of others. 
Of course, the principle is double-edged so that any action which is 
done freely which detracts value from others' lives can be said to be 
subject to a penalty. One desenres a reward or a penalty which is in 
proportion to the am:::>\IDt of good or bad one has produced and in the 
case of reward, it should be sarething the agent wants. 
When applied to the question of property rights, this principle would 
yield the following consequences. Since la.I::our is a purposeful 
activity, often directed at taking an object from the state of nature, 
the appropriate reward for the value added, may be the object 
concerned. However it need not be. The labourer may not care whether 
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he gets that particular object but only that he gets food, security, 
status. In which case a system of con1ton ownership can easily fulfill 
the requirenent of the desert principle. Even if he does want the 
object, this argument does not provide an unequivocal defence of 
private property rights. 
Secondly, if labouring is to be rewarded with appropriation, where 
appropriation is to the prejudice of others a penalty in the fonn of 
taxes, is to be exacted. It is difficult to estimate the anount of 
hann done to others by appropriation. Appropriation of vast 
territories in 1700 may have done little hann, but the continuation of 
those territories in the control of one person may do a great deal of 
hann now. When was the evil perpetrated (if ever)? When, and how, 
smuld it be penalized? 
Furthe.rnore, Protrlhon's criticism still has force. Why should I pay 
for a benefit I didn't ask for? In a system where labour does give 
title, people labour in order to appropriate, but it remains an open 
question whether there smuld be such a system. If there were not, 
either people "WOuld not labour - so they 'WOuldn't be hard done by in · 
not receiving rewards - or if they did, and did without first making a 
particular contract, they "WOuld lose the fruits of their labour. Just 
as, if I came around and painted your house and then demanded payment, 
you "WOuld be justified in refusing. 
Inheritance poses problems for the notion of desert. One baby cannot 
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be said to deserve one million times as much as another. On the other 
hand, saneone who makes a significant contribution to mankind seems to 
deserve payment and his right to keep that payment seems to include 
the right to give it away to anyone he chooses - his own child, for 
instance. We ·have strong intuitions pulling each way. 
There is a further suggestion that people don't deserve their talents, 
since these are as much a matter of chance as is a wealthy family -
and that therefore they don't deserve the fruits of those talents 
either. This is partially reflected in our intuitive notion of desert 
when we reward people not only for their achievement or contribution 
but also for their (unsuccessful) attempts and sacrifices. 
6 - - - - - - - - - - -
Running through Becker and Mill's interpretation of Ux:ke is the idea 
that appropriation is justified if it leave others E>..xactly as they 
\Ere - either by doing nothing to them or by a canplicated mixture of 
hann and benefit. This, as we saw, seems to be the essential 
intuition which makes the argUment plausible. Nozick sums this up as 
"The crucial point is whether appropriation of an unowned object 
~rsens the situation of others". (Nozick, 1974 : 175). Nozick points 
out that one may make someone worse-off by one's appropriation in two 
different ways and so there are two possible ways of interpreting the 
restriction. These he calls, the strong and the weak versions of the 
proviso. His conclusions concerning property rights derive fran the 
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fact that he believes that it is the weaker version which is the 
correct one. 
He writes "Consider the first person Z for whan there is not enough 
and as good left to appropriate. The last person Y to appropriate 
left Z without his previous liberty to act on an object, and so 
worsened Z's situation. So Y's appropriation is not allowed under 
Locke's proviso. Therefore the next to last person X to appropriate 
l~ft Y in a worse position, for X's act ended pennissible 
appropriation. Therefore X's appropriation wasn't permissible ••••• And 
so on back to the first person A to appropriate a permanent property 
right". (176). The fact that there now or in the future, is not 
enough for all to appropriate means that there never ~re rights to 
full inheritable ownership. 
Or one can worsen a person's situation by not leaving him enough to 
use. In this case, Y's appropriation would not violate the proviso. 
Which fonn of the proviso ought to be imposed? Nozick asks "Is the 
situation of persons who are unable to appropriate (there being no 
more accessible and useful unowned things) worsened by a systE!ll 
allowing appropriation and permanent property?" (Nozick, 1974: 177). 
; 
A strange question. Does Nozick rrean that if Z cannot appropriate it 
makes no difference to him whether others have done so - since in a 
system which allowed no property, he would not be able to appropriate 
either? 
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He certainly would be worse off in other ways: he would have less to 
use 1 he would be in the pcMer of the owners 1 he would feel himself at 
a disadvantage in competitive situations and as a result, he may lose 
all self~steem. Nozick says that there are various facts about a 
system of private property which make everyone, including the 
propertyless, better off. 'Ihese are that such a system is more 
productive, allows more soope for individuality and provides an 
incentive for people to hold back for future generations. 
In deciding whether a person is made worse-off, Nozick says one must 
carpare his present holdings with his share of "all the incane that is 
based upon untransfonred raw materials and given resources" which for 
the United States, is est.imated at about five percent of the national 
incane (Pg. 177). On Pg. 181 he writes, "The results, however, may be 
co-extensive with same conditions about catastrophe, since the 
baseline for CC~t"parison is so low as corrpared to the productiveness of 
a society with private appropriation that the question of the Lockean 
proviso being violated arises only in the case of catastrophe". Why 
soould Nozick canpare the welfare of a landless person in a capitalist 
society with the welfare of a hunter-gatherer. SUrely such a person 
is worse off in not being able to develop his share to the full. For 
instance, if my father left a piece of land to my sister and me 
without dividing it, and I took nine-tenths of it before she was old 
enough to stop me and increased the value of that area ten-fold. If, 
on caning of age she increased the value of the remaining land to its 
full extent (also ten-fold) and demanded her share from me, and I gave 
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her four units (out of my ninety) claiming that that was all I had 
deprived her of -would she be content? Should she be expected to be 
content? 
Mankind's relationship to the earth and its fruits does not 
necessarily follow this nndel. But I.Dcke does start with the 
assumption that God gave the earth to all men in ccmnon. The example 
shows that if people can make any valid claim to a share of the 
earth's resources, their claim is not satisfied if they receive the 
equivalent of that share in ~roney or fcx:>d because what they receive 
does not have the same capacity to be exploited as their original 
share would have done. They are worse-off in that they are deprived 
of the opportunity of increasing the value of their holding to an 
extent detennined by their industry. It is not obvious that the 
weaker version of the proviso is the one ~ should adopt. 
7 - - - - - - - - - - -
It appears that there are three different arguments for Locke's 
conclusion that if one mixes one's labour with an object one canes to 
awn it. These are: that appropriation is 
1. Necessary for the consumption and efficient exploitation of 
resources; 
2. That labouring makes an object part of oneself and as such 
- 40 -
protected by the same rights as one's body~ 
3. And one deserves to receive the object if one has :Unproved the 
\\Urld .by labouring on it. 
The first appears to be untrue or inconclusive as raw materials and 
land can be exploited without a system of private property and such a 
systan can protect the rights of the inefficient and -weak to property 
while excluding sane rational and industrious people fran exercising 
their abilities. 
The second and third each rest on an assumption which remains to be 
proved. Although if one incorporates a physical object into one's 
suum one may come to own it, when is one entitled to so incorporate 
it? Granted that one deserves the fruit of one's labour if one has 
the right to labour in order to acquire the fruits in the first place, 
but does one have the right to labour on these tenns? 
There are two distinct rights 
1. The right to keep the product of one's labour. 
2. The right to have something to labour on in order to acquire the 
product. 
Locke does not believe anyone has 2. ~ therefore it would be no 
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violation of anyone's rights if from the beginning or in a new area, 
land was appropriated in camon and no-<>ne was allowed to fence off 
any for his exclusive use. What are IDcke' s arguroonts for saying that 
a system of private prq:erty rather than of public property should 
exist? 
He says that a system of private property can develop spontaneously, 
whereas systems of carmon property are possible only where groups have 
agreed to treat something as conm:>n property. 
However, Gibbard questions whether a hard libertarian position would 
support the developrent of property rights in the manner IDcke 
describes. Such a position ~uld suppose that all people have equal 
freedan of action and that they lose these rights only if they give 
them up voltmtarily or if they violate the rights of others in a way 
which puts them into a state of war with them. (Gibbard, 1976 : 
77-88). 
Such rights ~uld allow one to use, consume and transform things (to 
an extent) since it is not a violation of a man' s rights to change his 
physical environment. '!hey would not allow one to appropriate, 
however, since appropriation entails the curtaibrent of others' rights 
and this can only happen with their consent. Gibbard nak.es the 
reverse claim from Locke. IDcke says that private property is natural 
and carm:m property requires convention, while Gibbard says that 
carmon property is natural and private property requires convention. 
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'I.ocke slxMs that the sort of convention necessary could not possibly 
occur (since it would require people from different generations to 
meet) • He also tries to show that private property is necessary for 
life and happiness -but it is not obvious that this is so. He also 
tries to show that property rights were an extension of other natural 
(relatively undisputed) rights. He has not done so. 
If private property is not necessary, nor is it natural, nor is it 
hannless, it remains an open question whether one should have the 
right to appropriate things and exclude others. This remains, in fact 
a question for collective human choice. 
1. By "property", "own", "appropriate", I understand not physical 
relations of people to objects but legal or moral relations. 
2. Locke seems to ignore the possibility that people may have been 
forced to accept the convention. 
3. Locke believed that if one's servant mixes his labour with an 
object, one would care to own the product. The foregoing 
argument, if it -were successful, would seem to suggest that the 
servant had acquired the product. 
4. Marx writes in a similar vein but with less enthusiasm, "That 
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which exists for me through the nedium of money, that which I can 
pay for. • • that I am, the possessor of the nnney. My own poWer 
is as great as the pc:JWer of my rooney. • • What I am and can do is, 
therefore, not at all detennined by my individuality ••• As an 
individual I am lame, but rooney provides rre with twenty-four 
legs, therefore, I am not lame, I am a detestable, dishonourable, 
unscrupulous and stupid man, but money is honoured and so also is 
its possession. M:>ney is the highest gcx:xl, and so its possessor 
is gocd. Besides, rooney saves me the trouble of being dishonest: 
therefore, I am presurred honest, I am stupid, but since money is 
the real mind of all things, how should its possessor be stupid? 
(Marx, 1844) • 
5. Fran P J Proudhon What is Property? 
and J S Mill Principles of Political Econ~ 
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CHAPI'ER III 
MARX'S CRITICISM OF PRIVATE PROPERTY 
In this chapter I assess the claim that private property is inimical 
to justice and to freedcm. My answer to the question of whether it is 
inimical to justice is ambivalent. I reject Marx's labour theory of 
value which if true, would have shown capitalism to be thoroughly 
unjust. 1 If justice depends on the notion of desert then there is a 
sense in which capitalists deserve their property (in cases where they 
have obtained it by hard work or as a gift fran others). I claim that 
our notion of desert is fundamental! y ambiguous and that our 
intuitions support both interpretations and their consequences. For 
this reason I believe the question of the justice of private property 
to be one which is inq:x:>ssible to answer. As regards private 
property's consequences for freedom, I believe that the libertarian 
claim that a free market means a free society and the socialist claim 
that it is the enemy of freedom, rests on another conceptual 
divergence but am more optimistic about arbitrating between the two 
concepts. Marx writes that capitalism is "a very Eden of the innate 
rights of man, which satisfies the rights of freedcrn, equality and 
property" (Capital 1:176). This, of course is intended as heavily 
ironical but many people believe these claims in all seriousness: man 
is free in a capitalist society because no master forces the labourer 
to work. He agrees to work and may opt out of the contract when he 
chooses. 'to'«:>rker and capitalist face each other as equals, since both 
are owners of conmodities the other needs. If the capitalist has more 
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than the "WOrker it is because he has "WOrked harder. Property rights 
are respected, since each party owns a cormodity and has exclusive 
control over it, which includes the right to alienate it. 2 
It is Marx's aim to expose this apparently free and fair contract as 
the very opposite of that. It is a point of controversy whether Marx 
condanned capitalism on the grounds that it was unjust. 
Allen W. Wood writes, "an econanic transaction is just if it 
hantnnizes with the prevailing node of production. Because 'justice' 
is a legalistic tenn, it is dependent on a particular legal system"~ 
and continues "The fact that transactions are just is no defence of 
capitalism. The justice of capitalist transactions consists merely in 
their being essentially capitalist". (Wood, 1979 :267-269). 
others claim that Marx was being ironical when he called capitalism 
just~ or that he was using an "inverted ccmna" sense of justice in an 
attarpt to explain why capitalism is believed so persistently to be 
just. Arneson (1980) for instance, believes that he had a different 
objective notion of justice. On Pg. 205 he argues that "Marx adheres 
to an austere notion of desert according to which people are 
responsible (at roost) for their intentions and not for the actual 
results of acting on their intentions, for those results are causally 
influenced by a wide variety of rroral contingencies. One is 
responsible only for what is within one's control" and therefore the 
just society is the one which rewards equally those who make equal 
- 46 -
productive sacrifices. Arneson claims that this notion is at the 
bottan of Marx's prescription for an ideal society embodied in '!be 
Critique of the Gotha Programme: "From each according to his ability, 
to each according to his need". Since it is assumed that each will 
try equally hard, and. it would be unjust to prevent anyone fran 
developing his full capacities by ignoring his needs. 
Whether or not .Marx thought capitalism unjust, it may be that we 
reject his idea that morality is dependent on the rrode of production 
and have an objective criterion of justice. It may be that his 
description of capitalist relations provides us with the material for 
saying capitalism is unjust. On the other hand, it may be that 
capitalism is just although it produces other evils. In which case 
these evils may not be reason enough to abolish it. I shall consider 
what an attack on capitalism as unjust, would be, assess it and 
discuss the other, more important attack which Marx did endorse - fran 
liberty. 
If capitalism can be said to be unjust it is because it is 
exploitative. Marx shows that capitalism is exploitative but it 
remains uncertain whether exploitation is a :purely technical tenn or 
whether it has nonnative connotations. The definition of exploitation 
is: the extraction of the surplus value of the labour of one class by 
another. According to .Marx in capital, the worker produces a 
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cx:mrodi.ty such as cotton. Part of the value of this is needed to 
replace the rmt~ materials and maintain the machinery; part is needed 
to keep the worker alive and fit. The fonner portion Marx calls 
constant capital; the latter, variable capital because while a given 
arrount of yarn will produce a constant ammmt of cotton however 
quickly it is used, a worker can work a six hour or a twelve hour day 
on approximately the same arrount of food. If he produces value 
greater than that needed for his maintenance etc. he produces surplus 
value which is appropriated by the capitalist. This appropriation 
constitutes capitalist exploitation: The worker works harder than he 
need but receives no extra reward and the capitalist does no work but 
receives the profit. 
Marx believed that capitalists purchase labour :power at its 
exchange-value and gain its use-value which enables them to produce a 
product whose exchange-value is greater than that of the labour-:power. 
The difference beb.een the two is surplus value. Marx says use-value 
is the value one enjoys in using a ccmoodity. Exchange-value is 
"determined by the socially necessary labour contained in it. 
Socially necessary ti.ne is the ti.ne required under normal conditions 
with average degree of skill, using modern industry ... " (Capital 
1: 1). 
G A Cohen [Cohen, 1978 (B)] argues that the claim "labour creates 
value" is false and that even if it were true it would not justify the 
rooral indignation at the fact that labourers do not receive all the 
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value they create. 
He. says Marxists argue: 
(1) Labour and labour alone creates value. 
(2) The labourer receives the value of his labour pc::Mer. 
( 3) The value of the product is greater than the value of his 
labour-power. 
{4) The labourer receives less value than he creates. 
(5) The capitalist receives the remaining value. 
{6) The labourer is exploited by the capitalist. 
[Cohen, 1978(B) :342] 
He says that the labour theory of value does not entail (1) and that 
{1) is in fact false. 
He writes "Suppose a coom::x:li.ty has a certain value at b, then that 
value, says the labour theory is determined by the socially necessary 
labour time required to produce a ccmrodity of that kind. ret us now 
ask: required to produce it when? The an~ is: at b, the time when 
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its value is to be explained. The amount of time needed to produce it 
in the past, and a fortiori the amount of time actually spent 
producing it are magnitudes irrelevant to its value". 
Advances in technology can reduce the socially necessary labour tine 
required for the production of a kind of ccrcrcodity. Natural 
occurrences, such as drought, can increase the necessary tine. 
Fashion can create or reduce the demand for a product and hence its 
value since Marx says ". • • nothing can have value without being an 
object of utility. If the thing is useless, so is the value contained 
in it ••• " 
Value, therefore, is not proportional to the labour in fact 
inrorporated in the object, but to the labour which would be necessary 
to produce a similar object. Such counterfactual labour explains 
value but obviously does not create it. For instance, if I happen to 
store a canister of fresh air today - it takes rre a few seconds. If, 
however, air pollution becanes so bad that fresh air is extrerrely rare 
and it takes an hour for scientists to extract and bottle a carparable 
arromt, then my air is valued at the equivalent of one hour's labour. 
The labour which 'created' it, did not determine its value. 
Coren notes that the doctrine that says that labour creates value is 
popular because it seans to support the condemnation of exploitation. 
He doubts whether it could do so even if it ~e true, if that is, it 
rests on the notion that the creators of value deserve what is 
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valuable. If, for instance the value of a ccmrodity were wholly 
detenn:ined by the extent and intensity of desire for it, then it could 
be said that the desirers created the value. But this would be no 
reason to claim that they deserved the valuable object. 
The labour theory of value seems to allow Marx to say that it is a 
conceptual necessity that workers be paid no nore than is necessary 
for their survival. If the value of a camodity is determined by the 
amJmlt of labour necessary to produce it, it follows that the value of 
labour power must be equivalent to the value of the hours spent 
producing the workers' sustenance. 
Marx claims that 
(1) Socially necessary labour creates value; 
Ricardo that 
(2) Value detennines equilibrium price. 
For each the claim is true by definition. If both were true, it would 
follow that 
(3) Socially necessary labour determines equilibrium price. 
This is untrue, because other factors such as distribution of means of 
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production affect equilibrium price. 
we are faced with two possibilities. Either price is independent of 
value. So that whatever the value of labour-power the wages (the 
price) of a worker are detennined by sare other mechanism. Trade 
Union pressure, for instance, has an effect on wages. Value has no 
bearing on the price of the conmcx1i ty either, so that nothing can be 
said about the differences in value be~ labour and product. 
Alternatively, value detennines equilibrium price. Fquilibrium price 
reflects the only sort of value there is - the extent and intensity of 
desire as against the supply of the desired ccnm:xli ty. In which case 
the intensity of workers 1 desire for work is balanced against the 
capitalist 1 s desire for profit and a price is fixed (a just price?) • 
Cohen adapts the Marxian argument to expose what he sees as the real 
basis for the charge of exploitation. He says "the workers create the 
product. They do not create value, but they create what has value. 
The small difference of phrasing covers an enomous difference of 
oonception. What raises a charge of exploitation is not that the 
capitalist gets sorre of the value the worker produces, but that he 
gets sane of the value of what the worker produces." [Cohen, 
1978(B):354]. 
This bypasses the question of what creates value. Whatever the value 
of the object capitalism is exploitative since the labourer receives 
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less than the value of what he creates. 
The capitalist does not produce and yet he receives payment. That is, 
alth:>ugh individual capitalists may \'tUrk alongside their employees, in 
their role as capitalists they do not labour and they do receive 
payrrent in this role which is distinct fran the wages they might pay 
themselves. 
It is not necessarily the case that surplus value is the difference 
beb\een the value of the product and the arnotmt necessary to resupply 
raN materials, maintain machinery and feed the "WOrkers. We have seen 
that \\Orkers can and do bargain for a higher wage. However, the 
capitalist only undertakes the enterprise in order to make a profit. 
So it is necessary that he receives sane of the 'surplus value. The 
question is: does he deserve that profit? Although he does not labour 
he is to some extent causally responsible for the existence of surplus 
value. 
Imagine a man who invents and makes a tractor. No-one else has a 
tractor or the skill to build one although the raw materials to do so 
are available. SUch a man can produce in three hours sufficient food 
to feed himself for a day. Everyone else has to work seven hours. It 
is conceivable that the others could strike up a bargain with the 
tractor owner whereby they labour for six hours, receive what they 
need for li~e and give_him the produce of three hours labour. They 
'\\UU!d be retter off. It is unclear that they 'WOUld have been 
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exploited in any perjorative sense. Similarly a dress designer or 
writer can employ people to produce his clothes or books. If thes~ 
are :popular the \\Urkers may be better paid than they would have been 
had they \\Urked for themselves or for scmeone else. There is a clear 
incentive for both parties to continue the contract. Similarly, an 
astute entrepreneur might recognise markets and rrore efficient means 
of production. It is not obvious that the capitalist can benefit only 
at the expense of the worker. The worker's productivity is not a 
constant sum which Im.lst be shared between \\Urker and capitalist. A 
Mandst might reply that the exarrples I have given are cases of 
innovation making the difference and as such ImlSt be exceptional 
cases. They \\Uuld concede that a designer or inventor has a r6le to 
play but claim that it follows only that he should receive a wage, not 
that he should be allowed the full powers of the capitalist. 
A rrore cammon contribution the capitalist makes is in the unification 
of a large amount of resources under the control of one CCH:>rdinating 
body. This enables reM materials to be exploited to their max:imurn 
efficiency. A craftsman might be able to ~rk shorter periods for the 
sane pay at a factory than for hilnself even when the capitalist's 
share is taken into account. A Marxist would undoubtedly res:pond that 
this may be true but unified control of vast and diverse means of 
production does not require a capitalist. 
The essential factor is that the capitalist in fact awns the means of 
production and that labour is of no use without tools and reM 
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materials. The capitalist provides the means of production and the 
worker the labour. Both are necessary and each receives recanpense 
for his contribution. If the capitalist gains the means of production 
by force or fraud he has no right to such earnings. If he makes then 
or otherwise works for them, he may. It becanes apparent that 
capitalism is only unjust if private property is unjust. One cannot, 
therefore, condemn the institution of private property because of the 
injustice of capitalism. 
It is perhaps this. which underlies the unreadiness to call capitalism 
unjust. In a very natural understanding of desert one deserves the 
equivalent in value of what one contributes. If people caoo to own 
things because they increase the value of those things and so deserve 
them (as IDcke says they do) then they deserve payment if they sell 
them and rent if they hire them out. 
A different account of desert might have different c6nsequences. In a 
case of A giving X to B, X often has a different value to A and to B. 
On the account of desert rrentioned here A would deserve recanpense 
equivalent to the value of what B received. On the different account 
A would deserve recompense equivalent to the value of what he gave up. 
One may need to take into account other considerations in choosing 
between these two conceptions of just payments for contribution. 3 
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The other attack on private property contends that it rerooves people's 
freedan or fails to produce the maxinrum arrount of freedan. 
G A Cohen (in Mephan & D H Ruben, 1981) criticizes a belief accepted 
by libertarians and liberals alike, that capitalism involves a 
"oorrq;>lete lack of restraint on individual freedom". Libertarians take 
this as justifying an unqualified free market economy. Liberals 
believe that there are other social values such as happiness and 
equality, and that there must be a canpromise. 
Cohen's "central contention is that liberals and libertarians see the 
freedom intrinsic to capitalism, but do not give proper notice to the 
unfreedom which necessarily accanpanies it" (1981:226). He .claims 
that the state places a constraint on one's freedom by preventing one 
from using other people's property which may am6unt to a constraint on 
using any object at all. The capitalist cl~ that the worker is free 
to sell his labour. The socialist that the worker is forced to sell 
his labour. Cohen believes these claims are canpatible: to be forced 
to do something entails that one is free to do it. If the socialist 
claim is true, however workers are impJrtantly unfree. They are not 
free not to sell their labour. 
It is clear that to same extent we are working with different notions 
of freedom, or at least with a very unclear notion. 
I think it is of :fundanental importance when confronted by two 
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theories each claiming to protect or increase, say, freedan to 
establish whether they are talking about the sane thing. If they are, 
at least one must be very wrong about the facts and it is of use to 
draw up a criterion acceptable to both for assessing the freedom of a 
society. When this is done, the question becates an empirical matter. 
If they are not talking about the sane thing, they probably have sare 
camon ground. If one could establish where they differ one could 
perhaps see which is rrost consistent with the essential features they 
agree upon. If neither side is especially inconsistent one can take 
the points of divergence as points at which to assess precisely why we 
value freedom so highly. "Freedom" is an errotive ~rd. It is 
difficult to say one does not want a society which is free. A 
conceptual analysis should perhaps focus on this value (and what is 
distinctive about it as opposed to the value of justice and happiness) 
and try to fonnulate a definition which picks aut those actions and . 
societies which best exemplify this desirable quality whether or not 
they are co-extensive with those conventionally called "free". 
A rough preliminary definition might argue that 
A: one is free if one is not restrained from doing what one wants. 
How then does one quantify freedom? An individual is more free the 
less he is restrained, and a society is rrore free the f~r restraints 
it imposes? Such definitions are enorrrously vague. They raise 
further questions. Is a person free if he is unrestrained by human 
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beings although constrained by natural forces? In the light of this 
possibility the definition of a free society begs the question. 
Perhaps a society which fails to remo~ natural restraints is no nore 
free than one which imposes restrictions. 
Further questions raised include: if one is free if nothing prevents 
one fran doing what one wants, is one free if one wants to do only 
what one is allowed to do? Is the happy slave free? If he is, then 
BraVe New World style genetic engineering of happy slaves, 
indoctrination, and lobotomies render people free. 
Accepting that this conclusion is counter-intuitive we are faced with 
two options: 
either B: one is more free the fewer restraints there are on one's 
actions absolutely: or 
C: one is more free if one is less restrained with respect to 
desired actions where one's desires are themselves free. 
I think there is sarething to be said for B. A society which prevents 
drug-abuse, free trade and suicide is to sare extent unfree whether or 
not people want to do these things, but I believe that a restriction 
on the perfonnance of an action one does not want to do is less 
.important than one on ~arething one does want to do. The intensity of 
the desire for an action llUlst have a bearing on the importance of the 
• 
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freedan which makes it possible. If it did not the freedan to nurder 
would have to be counted as equal to the freedan to live. There are 
practical difficulties in measuring desires but perhaps a rough guide 
would be: a society which prevents people doing X which they want to 
do very much is less free than one which prevents people doing Y which 
they don't particularly want to do. 
Again we are faced with the spectre of the Hegelian happy slave. If, 
as a result of indoctrination I don't much mind being your slave and 
having a slave would considerably enhance your freedom, ought you to 
be allowed to enslave me? Clearly one requires the notion of a free 
desire. Perhaps one desires freely when no-one has interfered with 
one's desires. 0 
D. Is one most free where there are. least restrictions on doing what 
one wants where others have not caused one's desires? 
But it is not uncontroversial that the untutored savage is more free 
than the educated man. One can influence another in a way which makes 
him more free. 
One can for instance 




(2) Qle can teach him reason which will enable him to see through 
propaganda •• 
( 3) One can intrcduce him to new pleasures and possibilities which 
will widen the soope of his choice. 
(4) One can forcibly break sorreone of an addiction so as to enable 
him to view his situation fran an objective, non-canpulsi ve 
position. 
Perhaps E: one is most free where there are the fewest restrictions on 
doing what one "WCmts where one has been influenced to have the freest 
desires. There are difficulties in canparing the weights of the 
different variables •. A roore fundamental difficulty is that an 
educator or parent has the capacity to create or destroy desires 
themselves as well as the capacity to provide optimum conditions for 
choosing between desires. Same desires prevent one from taking steps 
which will widen one 1 s future scope of choice and will otherwise be 
detrimental. This perhaps has the consequence that E reduces to F: 
one is roost free if one chooses and can do what it is roost in one 1 s 
interest to do? I prefer E, since F has a flavour of totalitarianism. 
'Ib be free seems to entail that there is more than one line of action 
one could choose. 
Non-human restraints such as ignorance and poverty do appear to limit 
one 1 s freedom. Active interference can saretimes render a person more 
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free. I believe, however, that the norality of manipulation of 
desires has primary interest for philosophy of education. To form and 
act upon the belief that another's desires are not in his best 
interest smacks of paternalism. It suggests that one believes one is 
a wiser person or that one has reached a superior position. 'Ibis is 
appropriate in dealing with children and the insane but is an 
insulting and dangerous attitude to adopt towards nost people. 
A further question is how to formulate a standard for the opt:i.Inal.ly 
free society. Is such a society the one with the largest anount of 
individual freedom? Does the distribution make a difference? Fobert 
Nozick (1974) says that behaviour toward each person ought to be 
constrained so that he is not to be used for any end except as he 
chooses. He believes this is a direct consequence of Kant' s 
categorical imperative: "Act in such a way that you always treat 
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, 
never sinq;>ly as a means, but always at the sarre tirre as an end". This 
is in contrast to the view that the maximization of freedom is to be 
set up as a goal to be pursued even at the expense of violation of 
sane individual rights. 
Brenk.ert writes that it is "the developrent of mari, his capacities and 
abilities, through his productive forces and relations towards a 
conscious mastery and control over these forces and relations 
(particularly those of his own creation) which Constitutes freedan". 
(Brenk.ert, 1978 : 138). To be free is "not to be susceptible to 
external, irrational and non-rational forces". (Ibid). 
I 
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Under capitalism, people "cane to consider the conditions and forces 
which detennine their lives to be simply natural aspects of their 
environment, manifestations of fate or chance rather than objects of 
possible, rational direction". (Brenkert, 1978 : 139). 
It is an interesting fact that if each member of a group acts 
rationally, independently and unrestrainedly, it is often the case 
that none of them will do as well as each would if the group decided 
collectively. '!his is typically the case in the face of large natural 
forces. Concerted action by the group can achieve m::>re than 
individual action but there is little incentive to co-operate. For 
example, a large wild beast is chasing two people. If both run each 
will have a fifty percent chance of smviving. If they both stay and 
fight they have a ninety percent chance of overcoming the creature and 
living. But each individual (call him A), considering the odds will 
realize that if the other, B, stays to fight he will be killed and A 
will have one hundred percent chance of escaping. If on the other 
hand B nms away, A -would be a fool to stay as he would have no chance 
of smviving. Co-operation is irrational for A in all circt.miStances 
(assuming A's non-cooperation does not cause B's non-cooperation) but 
rational for A and B taken as a pair. 4 
Brenkert -would claim. that this is the rrodel for much scx:::ial and 
individual choice. Under capitalism one has every incentive to 
acctmiU.late and invest \\ealth rather than to enjoy it. Both 
proletarians and capitalists try to live lives which are as abstemious 
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as possible in order to sacrifice to the "M:>ney God". '!he possession 
of noney means security and pc::~Wer. Expenditure undennines this. Not 
only do people fail to use their noney for pleasure and enrichnent, 
they discourage desires other than the stricti y necessary. As a 
result they becane cynical and :impoverished as people. 
Production is the other great goal but production is not aimed at the 
satisfaction of needs but is an end in itself, and if anything causes 
artificial needs which are unnecessary, and even debilitating in order 
to fulfil its real function of producing more capital. labour, 
itself, which should be a means of self-expression and the achievenent 
of mastery over the enviro:nrrent, beccmes sarething dreaded by all 
members of society. Fbr the worker it represents the loss of freedom 
of action and for the capitalist it represents a socially inferior 
role. 
Like expenditure, charity endangers one' s power-base. capitalists are 
forced to be ruthless if they are to survive - and to extract as much 
as possible fran their workers and to undercut canpeti tors where they 
can. The workers themselves have to c~te ruthlessly with each 
other since there are not enough jobs for all. (This is based loosely 
on Marx's account in the 1844 manuscripts) . This antagonism is an 
evil in itself but it also prevents most, if not all people, from 
realizing their individual ends. If freedan consists in being able to 
do what one wants (or to achieve the ends one desires) it may be that 
the capitalist system is unfree in consistently producing less of what 
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people want than an alternative system would. People are forCed to 
make choices which hann or restrict others, in order to maximize their 
own welfare. A co-operative venture - whereby each could be assured 
that the others would not make selfisl), socially hannful choices -
could considerably increase everyone's well-being. 
Snail scale examples of the phenc:m:mon of increasing individuals' 
options by lind ting their free action would be - forbidding anyone to 
carry a gun; forbidding the destruction of young, ccmnunally-owned 
trees; or the killing of nore than a fixed quota of fish; forbidding 
private vehicles in central business districts. Enforced poolings of 
books, magazines, records, toys or tools supplemented by a 
well-organized loan system might be vast! y preferable to a system 
where each person hoards a small supply of these. If the option of 
buying a house one didn't intend to inhabit were unavailable one would 
spend the noney on self-improvement (an alternative investment) or · 
simply on pleasure. In such circumstances these would not be 
dangerous options as one would not have to fear others' aa:;IUiring 
power over one by speculation. 
If this model really applied to capitalist societies, the envisaged 
restrictions on freedan need not appear as the use of sate as a means 
to the ends of others. 
However, it is very unlikely that everyone is trapped. It is nore 
likely that the rich (or the very rich) in a capitalist society are 
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much rcore free than they would be in a socialist society. A1 though 
one of them may be forced to build a facto:cy rather than take a world 
tour on a luxw:y liner this year, neither option would be available to 
him under socialism. It is not obvious that saving is not a good 
thing for the connm.mi ty and that a system which encourages it is 
degenerate. It is rcore likely that what is wrong with capitalism (if 
anything) is that some people have rcore freedan than they could 
possibly have otherwise but that this is at the expense of an 
excessive am:::>unt of unfreedan on the part of others. 
Nozick has an argument to show that "liberty upsets the patterns", 
that is, that free action must result in a distribution of wealth 
which does not confo:rm to any ideal pattern; and hence that any 
attarpt to maintain such a pattern must interfere with people's 
freedan. 
On Pg. 160 he invites his opponent to imagine any distribution (call 
it Dl) of resources such as a distribution in which each has an equal 
share. In this society there is a basketball player called Wilt 
Chamberlain whom eve:cyone is keen to watch. He contracts to play with 
a team in return for twenty-five cents of the price of each ticket. 
The spectators know about this contract and one million people pay to 
watch him. At the end of the season he has $250 000 which is far rrore · 
than anyone else has. Nozick asks "Is he entitled to this incxxne? Is 
/ 
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the new distribution D2 unjust? If so, why? There is no question 
about whether each of the people was entitled to the control over the 
resources they had in D1, • • • if D1 was a just distribution and people 
voluntarily moved fran it to D2, transferring parts of their shares 
they \\e:t:e g~ven under .D1 (what was it for if not to do sarething 
with?)_ 1sn:'t D2 also just?" (Nozick, 1974 : 161). 
G A Cohen [Cohen, 1978(C)] criticizes Nozick's argument. Nozick 
claims that third parties are left exactly as they were. They "still 
have their legitimate shares; their shares are not changed". 
Cohen. denies that this is so "For a person's effective share depends 
not only on what he has but on what he can do with what he has, and 
that depends on what others have and on how what others have is 
distributed". [Cohen, 1978(C):252]. Chamberlain for instance, can 
buy a set of houses and leave them unoccupied with speculative 
interest. His fans, acting independently, could not do so. 
r-Dre importantly, the interests of the yet unborn are affected by such 
exchanges. Nozick believes a man may sell himself into slavery but 
that he cannot thereby sell his offspring as well. Similarly, Cohen 
argues, he ought not to be able to render them destitute by his 
extravagance. 
Nozick makes no provision for people entering the ccmnuni ty as 
children. Either they would be dependent upon their parents' goodwill 
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and ccrrpetence for their shares. This would not sit well with the 
idea of the original "fair" distribution: why should merely being born 
later give one less right to a fair and secure share? Alternatively, 
the resources might be periodical! y confiscated and redivided or 
continually taxed or repossessed on the death of each individual to 
prOV"ide a pool out of which each newccmer could be given his share. 
These latter options which seem logical extensions of Nozick' s offer 
to his opponent, undennine the alm:>st inviolability of property 
rights. 
Cohen says that Nozick's claim "If people -were entitled to dispose of 
the resources of which they \\ere entitled (under Dl) didn't this 
include their being entitled to gi'Ve it to, or exchange it with, Wilt 
Cl'lalrrerlain?" [Cohen, 1978 (C) :261] either begs the question if it is 
an assertion or is inoonclusi ve if it is an argmnent. Their original 
entitlerrent "WOuld include the right to give or contract as they choose 
only if the original entitlements were of "the absolute Nozick.ian sort 
and this cannot be assumed". Alternatively one can interpret Nozick 
as claiming that to exclude such rights "WOuld involve restraints on 
important freedans. Cohen says such an appeal would be inconclusive 
as Nozick fails to consider all the reasons one might have for 
preventing the exchanges, such as the power which might accrue to 
Chamberlain. 
Cohen writes "Nozick forbids any act which restricts freedan. This 
neans that if it \\ere true that certain exercises of freedan would 
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market, similarly if individuals acted and contracted legitimately in 
such a way that left worker X with no option but to take sane 
particularly unpleasant job or starve, he is not forced to make the 
choice. 
Cohen, attempting to explain the strange fact that libertarians and 
liberals believe that capitalism involves no unfreedan, writes (Pg. 
228) "There is a definition of freedan which is implicit in much 
libertarian wri t~g - that interference is not a sufficient condi tian 
for unfreedom - one is unfree only when saneone unjustifiably 
interferes with one". 
This has counterintuitive consequences for it means that a properly 
convicted nnrrderer is not deprived of his freedan by being imprisoned. 
This definition of freedan can also undennine a typical libertarian 
argument against taxation or nationalization of industries. They 
cannot argue that interference with private property is wrong because 
it reduces freedan "for one can no longer take for granted, what is 
evident on a rrorally neutral account of freedan, that interference 
with private property does reduce freedan." (Cohen, 1978 (C). They 
can escape this paradox by arguing that such interference is wrong on 
other grounds such as injustice and that therefore it renders :people 
unfree. But they are still operating with an inadequate notion of 
freedcm. 
As we have seen justice is itself a highly controversial tenn and to 
sane extent relative to the system of property relations of the 
- 67 -
lead to totalitarianism, Nozick would still protect them. Market 
freedan itself would be sacrificed if the only way to preserve it were 
by limiting it". [Cohen, 1978 (C) :256]. 
There seen to be two questions to be asked in assessing a distribution 
pattern. The first is whether it is brought about by free actions; 
the second whether it produces and protects freedans. 
It seens unlikely that societies which satisfy one standard 
necessarily satisfy the other. lilozick, however, believes they do 
because of his peculiar notion of freedan. On Pg. 262 he writes 
"Whether a person's actions are voluntary depends on what it is that 
limits his alternatives. If facts of nature do so, the actions are 
volunt:aJ:y" and Pg. 263 "other people's actions place limits on one's 
available opportunities. Whether this makes one's resulting action 
non-voluntal:y depends on whether these others had a right to act as 
they did". For instance, saneone who \>AJrks on a desert island in 
order not to starve is not forced to work; nor are any of the agents 
in the following example forced. Imagine t\o.enty-six men A-Z and 
twenty-six wanen Al-Zl. Each would rather marry sareone than not 
many at all. All the \t.'OIYlell rank all the men "in the sarre order of 
desirability and vice-versa, i.e. all waren would prefer to man:y A to 
any of the others etc. If A and A1 marry they reduce everyone else's 
options. B and Bl \>AJuld prefer to marry A1 and A respectively but 
take each other as second best. The pairing off continues until z and 
.zl are left with no choice but to marry each other. In the labour 
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manent. To act within one's rights or justifiably is to do what one 
likes with what one has. To act unjustifiably is to interfere or to 
use w.hat belongs to another without pennission. This begs questions 
about whether people have rights to appropriate originally and if they 
do, whether such rights include the right of absolute, exclusive 
control into perpetuity. An objective criterion is required to judge 
between these systems. There exists a relatively clear intuitive 
notion of freedan as a non-m::>ral good, the extent to which one can 
control one's life, and the range of choices one has. 
Nozick's ideally free society is one where agents act canpletely 
independently. - Their actions affect themselves only, so interference 
wi. th these is a dramatic violation of their freedan. Of course, they 
sanetimes co-operate or exchange things but this is always a clear-cut 
case of using a person or something which belongs to a person. In 
these cases, the other's consent is required before one may use him or 
his property. If one has his consent the use is legitimate. If one 
does not, it is a violation of his rights. 
However, one may question the clear distinction be~ self-regarding 
and other-regarding acts. What about action on inanimate objects? 
M::>st action requires raw materials and changing one's physical 
environment must affect others. Consider a world where no-one owns 
anything. If I exercise my freedom of action by burning all the 
available food or building a trench around you and filling it with 
acid, I affect you although these are not cases of using you or your 
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property. Do I require your consent? If I act thus without your 
consent do I not, acoording to Nozick, act justifiably? 
If I appropriate or inherit the greater part of the land others are 
morally obliged (and perhaps physically forced) not to live there, 
w:)rk there or eat the produce. Their options are reduced by my 
action. Perhaps they simply have to choose a new picnic site or a new 
route. fvt>re disturbingly, they may find it impossible to survive 
without my assistance. They are then at my mercy. Their choice is to 
do what I demand or starve. My choice is to offer them charity, 
reject them or make a bargain with them. If we decide to make a 
contract, in a sense neither party is using the other without his 
consent, just as if I built a trench around him and filled it with 
acid and then offered to build him a bridge at a high price. However 
it seems arbitrary to insist that this exchange is voluntary when the 
original action (the building of the ditch, the appropriating)' was not 
accepted by both parties although it affected both. With r~ard to 
property acquisition it seans unlikely that there are genuinely 
self-regarding acts. 
The Wilt Charrberlain argument may seem to offer a solution. Each 
individual is given a share. He is self-sufficient. He does not 
require use of others' shares. It is clear which inanimate objects he 
is justified in acting upon and which he is not. If he spoils his 
share that is his look-out. The fault with the mcx1el however is that 
it entirely ignores newcomers. 
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If \\e accept as mistaken the notion of a sphere in which the actions 
of an individual affect himself alone and which are therefore, 
properly an object of his choice, the question remains: what is the 
optllnally free organization of a ccmnunity? 
If \\e reject the moralized notion of freedom, and hold that the 
murderer is forced to go to prison and that the last couple z and Zl 
are forced to marry, \\e are no longer able to say that there is 
scmething wrong with someone forcing, or having the capacity to force 
scmeone else to do sanething. If B cannot live tmless he has sex with 
A, A has power over him which is on a par with the power the 
capitalist is said to have over the worker. Is A not entitled to this 
pc:Mer? I think she is. 
A more controversial case . would be one where A was drowning and B made 
A promise to pay a large sum (or work for a long period) in exchange 
for saving his life. 
Sanetirnes forcing is wrong, scmetirres it is not. The examples 
involving sex or marriage seem to differ from the others in that what 
one wants in desiring to marry or have sex with X is use of his body, 
sane oontrol over his actions and access to his privacy. Rights to 
one's person and privacy are important and not in dispute as are 
property rights. My right to my piece of land is not necessarily a 
stronger claim than your right to a piece of land to live on. X's 
right over his body is always a stronger claim than Y's desire or need 
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to use X's body. 
Another consideration is that what Y wants is not so much X's body as 
X's affection, desire and willingness to share his body and private 
life. Forced sex and. forced marriage are objectionable to the person 
forced, and tmsatisfactory to the recipient in a way forced taxation 
is not. '!hat is, to abolish the pc:Mer X hp.s over Y, or to allow Y 
freedan of action in this case would involve far greater violations of 
freedom. But this exarrple is sufficiently and relevantly different 
fran cases concerning property to have very different consequences. 
We want a society in which people have as much control over important 
aspects of their lives as is possible considering the natural 
resources available and the level of technology; in which individuals 
or groups are not at the mercy of others and so in their power. 
But, a sick man is at the mercy of a doctor, a suicidal lover is at 
the mercy of his beloved, saneone who has just destroyed his share of 
the food supply is at the mercy of others. 'Ihese powers differ in 
that 
(1) greater violations of freedom would be required to reroove them. 
( 2) The tmpleasant coo ices faced by the victims were not brought 
about directly or indirectly by the actions of the powerful. 
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(3) They are isolated and peculiar cases whereas private property 
systematically creates and aggravates situations of inequality, 
of power and dependence. 
A society in which such power structures cannot develop may be rrore 
free than one in which they inevitably do, in spite of the unfreedcm 
involved in prohibiting "capitalist acts between consenting adults". 
On the socialist alternative "Universal dependence, this naturai form 
of the world-historical co-operation of individuals will be 
transfonned by this cormrunist revolution into the control and 
conscious mastecy of these powers". (Marx, The German Ideology: 
(Feuerbach 16). 
It is interesting to examine the envisaged administration of these 
powers and to c:;orrpare the degree of freedom like! y in such a society 
with the degree of freedcm in capitalist societies. 
"Society will ensure that the an'()unt of social labour expended on a 
product is equivalent to the demand for the product". (III, 16.) 
"Society distributes labour-power, and rreans of production to the 
different lines of occupation. The producers rray eventually receive 
paper checks, by rreans of which they withdraw from the social supply 
of means of consumption a share ••• These checks are not rroney; they 
do not circulate." (II, 18:2). 
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Strict division of lalx>ur will be alx>lished. From the social product 
will be deducted what is necessacy to maintain and expand the means of 
production; what is necessacy for social services and the costs of 
administration. The remainder will be distributed. During the first 
stage, the lalx>urer will receive azrounts relative to the nuniber of 
hours he has laboured. Later, however, they ~n't receive rewards in 
proportion to the am::>unt of ~rk they do since this recognises 
differences in mental and physical capacity, which is merely another 
fonn of privilege. At the same time it ignores differences of needs. 
One ~rker has :rrore children, or a capacity for :rrore training, or a 
need for :rrore roodical treatment than another. In such a society ~rk 
and wealth will be distributed "From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his needs". (A critique of the Gotha Programte 
quoted in .Ma:rx on Econanics). 
This picture is idyllic but it makes assumptions about the 
possibilities of human nature which seem to have no basis in fact. 
These are: 
(A) That :rrost people will want to ~rk i.e. they will ~rk for the 
love of it rather than for gain. SaTe people do enjoy their 
work, :rrost people do not. W:)uld it be possible so to change the 
nature of ~rk that :rrost people did? Possible changes are: 
(1) If ~rk could cane to be regarded as a means of 
self-expression, people ~uld choose to ~rk as artists do; 
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(2) If one had reason to care deeply for the rest of the 
corrmuni ty, people would work as priests work - to improve 
the general well-being of the ccmnuni ty and even be prepared 
to spend scme of their time doing distasteful but necessary 
tasks. 
(3) If physical labour ceased to be stigmatized, manual 
labourers might cane to take a pride in their work. 
( 4) If work were varied to prevent boredan and there were a 
sharing of pleasant and unpleasant tasks. 
(5) If individuals had sufficient influence over projects they 
were involved in that their accanplishment gave them a sense 
of achievement. 
It is a further assumption that people will be contented with 
relatively circumscribed possessions since there is no scope in such a 
society for a worker to work overtime for extra payment. It is 
possible that one will receive one's pleasures cammunally - and that 
one will see the enjoyment of objects in a new light, so that one will 
not have to possess physically books, artworks, houses etc. in order 
to enjoy them. 
Another assumption is that the enonrous powers given to an 
administrative body will not be abused or used mistakenly. There seem 
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to be no safeguards against corruption. 5 
Even if people do not want to do the things the corrmu.nist society 
"WOuld forbid, individuals 'WOuld still be unfree in not being allowed 
to do them. In this case the restrictions would not be inp::>rtant. It 
is more likely however that people will not naturally develop a 
genuine love of society, and of "WOrk and an indifference to 
possessions. In this case a socialist society will have to use force 
to make people act in ideal ways~ and/ or that it will use various 
forms of indoctrination to make them want the good of the camnmi ty. 
Further, the administrative body which will of necessity develop to 
distribute jobs and food will have great power aver the rest of the 
canmunity. 
On each of the several criteria of freedan such a society is likely to 
fail. 
(1) In the absolute number of restrictions it imposes. 
(2) In preventing people from doing what they (alnost inevitably) 
will want. 
(3) In manipulating their desires. 
( 4) And in allowing the existence of a group which has power over 
important aspects of others' lives. 
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It is a m::x>t point whether the lack of freedan in this picture exceeds 
the lack of freedan in the capitalist one but perhaps an irrelevant 
question. Although collectivization seems likely to fail in this 
respect (and seems to have done so where it has been attsnpted), the 
Marxian critique of capitalism as unfree still has force. Forbmatel y 
these are not the only two alternatives. 
Footnotes 
1. Private property is not, of course, equivalent to capitalism. 
But capitalism entrenches the right of the owner to use his 
property as he pleases and to strike up any bargain regarding it 
that he can with others. It is this right which, when the owner 
has amassed more than he can possibly use, and others are 
compelled by poverty to ask his assistance, facilitates 
"capitalist exploitation". 
2. It is a simplification and perhaps irrelevant to talk of the 
\\Orker /capitalist dichotany at this s_tage, J K Galbraith has 
argued convincingly that power has noved out of the hands of the 
capitalists and into the hands of managers. He writes "In the 
past three decades there has been steady accumulation of evidence 
on the shift of p::JWer fran owners to managers within the rrodem 
large corporation. The power of the stockholders • • . has seerred 
increasingly tenu~us" (Galbraith, 1967:49) and "It will now be 
clear what accords power to a factor of production or to those 
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who own or control it. Power goes to the factor which is hardest 
to obtain or replace • • • In the industrial system, while capital 
is used in large arrounts, it is, at least in peacetime, even nnre 
abundantly supplied ••• At the same time the requirement of 
technology and planning have greatly increased the need of the 
industrial enterprise for specialized talent and for its 
organization. The industrial system must rely, in the main, on 
external sources for this talent • • • One should expect i from past 
experience, to find a new shift of power in the industrial 
enterprise, this one from capital to organized intelligence 
(Galbraith, 1967:56-57) • 
II 
Mai:x 1 s arguments, however, are seminal and I shall discuss them 
in his tenns. I believe they still have relevance for the 
questions of whether the law of· supply and demand should 
determine distribution of resources and power entirely; and 
whether the possession and use of capital (as shares for example) 
entitles one to enjoy the income. 
(3) These conflicting intuitions are reflected in our legal system. 
Attempted murder is punished - but more lightly than successful 
murder - drunken driving is punished less harshly if it results 
in no damage than if it causes an accident. 
( 4) A more popular model for this situation is "The Prisoners 1 
Dilenma". 
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(5) Alan Ryan writes on this point "Marx's claim that 
'administration' would replace 'politics' roused Bakunin to 
accuse hiln of proposing a 'pedantocracy' , a tyranny of professors 
of econanics and industrial relations, and the idea that the 
cx:mmmist party w:mld, uniquely be uncorrupted by~ nOW" looks 
like a bad joke • • • Which is why Marx's notes on Bakunin' s 
Statism and Anarchy, in The First Intemational and After (Pg. 
333-8) look too much like an atterrpt to answer real doubts with 
definitional answers - that is, by reiterating that what people 
will have under socialism will not be political ~, to which 
the only reply is, 'so what?'." (Ryan, 1984(B):172). 
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CHAPrER IV 
THE NEO-LIBERALS' CASE FOR PRIVATE. PROPERTY 
In this chapter I examine axguments advanced by the nee-liberals 1 to 
the effect that collective ownership of property and the agreerrent on 
particular ends and their relative priority which this property is to 
be used, which follow of necessity, is inimical to freedom, dignity 
and econanic efficiency. I first assess the claim that 
collectivization of resources is invariably linked to a hierarchy or 
purposes held in conm::>n by the conrnunity and examine the nature of 
this link. In the next section I shall discuss Michael Oa.k.eshott' s 
claim that the concentration of power brought about by 
collectivization is a great threat to freedan. Thereafter I shall 
examine the claims made by Oakeshott, N:>zick and Hayek that such a 
system cannot toLerate opinions or behaviour which differ from those 
of the planners - whether these be a small group or a majority: and 
that as a result it is impossible to maintain such a system without 
coercion; that such a system is totally unnecessary for haniDny and 
economic efficiency and that it is inimical to autonomy and variety. 
It seems clear that proponents of collectivization such as Marx and_ 
his foll~rs, accept this characterization. M:irx believed that a 
free market system was unjust, restrictive and psychologically 
unhealthy. (I have discussed this in detail in an earlier chapter) . 
In order to realize justice and maximize happiness, 
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(1) Production must be organized to satisfy people's needs (capital 
III, 10). 
(2) Jobs must be distributed according to capacity (II 18:12). 
(3) Products must be distributed according to need. {Critique of the 
Gotha Progranme). 
The natural interactions between consumer and producer, employer and 
l.aOOurer must be prevented from occurring. They must be mediated by 
the state. The only way this is possible is if a single united body 
takes decisions and there is no scope for selfish individuals to drive 
hard bargains. 
G A Cohen says "The rule of things is the price of bourgeois freedan" • 
[Cohen, 1978(A) :125]. Only concerted action will produce the power to 
overcx::xne natural barriers. An analogy with the prisoner's dilerrma 
situation, it seems that the power of individuals acting as a group is 
often greater than the sum of the pc:Mer of each of the individuals 
acting independently. This became evident in the industrial 
revolution when production beccure enonrously rrore efficient, not 
roorely because of improved technology, but also because workers and 
means of production were organized in far larger units than they had 
previously been. Taking this to its seemingly logical conclusion, if 
an entire nation can collaborate in the pursuit of a goal, its power 
will be increased still further. 
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FurtheDtDre, it is believed that the pursuit of separate, often 
conflicting ends produces carpeti tion and antagonism and is inimical 
to fraternity, which is a good in itself. 
Marxists therefore consider it desirable that a nation (or the whole 
w::>rld) tmites in collective action towards a camon set of goals and 
see collectivization of property as the first step toward this. The 
nee-liberals realize the close link be~ the ~ but do not 
describe it in the sane way. Oakeshott believes that collectivization 
creates great ~r but focuses on the danger rather than the premise 
that this power represents. (oakeshott ; 1962). Nozick and Hayek 
believe that collectivization of property and the collective use of 
property require unifonni ty of goals, and such a requirement actually 
weakens the corrbined power of the economy as well as involving brutal 
and unnecessary interferences with people's minds and actions. 
(Nozick, 1974; Hayek, 1973). 
3. oakeshott writes: "Fran one :point of viE!W', property is a fonn of 
power, and an institution of property is a particular way of 
o:rganizing the exercise of this fonn of ~r in a society" and since 
he says freedcm requires "the absence fran our society of overwhelming 
concentrations of power" (Cekeshott, 1962:40) he naturally believes 
that the system of property most likely to protect freedom is one in 
which control over property is most widely distributed and this rreans 
private property. 
oakesmtt agrees that property is power and that collectivization 
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would create a great deal of power but he differs from the Marxists, 
in p:rrt in his oonception of freedom. 2 He believes it to be the 
absence of ~rs which can threaten one's existing liberties rather 
than the existence of powers to fulfil needs, create stimulating jobs 
and rerrove antagonism .be~ people. He is bothered less by the fact 
that -we are unable to overoc:rre some of the imperfections in our 
society such as hunger and exploitation than by the spectre of a body 
which has the physical and legal pc::Mer to interfere in men's lives. 
It is not nerely a disagreement concerning definition, it is also in 
large part an empirical disagreement. He does not oonsider the 
.i.nperfections to be nearly as appalling as do the Marxists; he does 
not believe that many of them could be changed and, unlike Marx and 
Plato, he is deeply pessimistic about the likelihood of govermnent 
remaining in the hands of the selfless, patriotic and enlightened. 
Private property is only one of the institutions which diffuse power. 
Families and private schools inculcate a variety of values, beliefs 
and tendencies and undennine the attempts of any group to oontrol and 
rrotivate a nation to united action. Independent religious and 
cultural groups have the same effect. In the political arena, 
Oakeshott speaks of a division of pc::Mer between the past, present and 
future. By the "past" he neans the existence of a constitution which 
limits the freedom of any legislative body but which is not canpletely 
inflexible. As regards "future" he is referring to constitutional 
checks which prevent any current ruler fran making his laws or his 
pc::Mer binding for all time. These legal checks would be without force 
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however if they were not combined with a similar diffusion of real 
power. Real p<:JWer rests with the military, but as Nozick has 
convincingly argued in the first part of Anarchy, State and Utopia, 3 
it is desirable that the state has a rronopol y on military power. The 
other, rrore important. kind of real power is econanic power which rests 
with the controllers of property. 
It \\Uuld appear to follow fran Oakeshott' s principles that he 'WOUld 
favour interference in the market to prevent the appearance of 
monopolies or other naturally occurring concentrations of pc:Mer. 
However, he writes "The institution of property rrost favourable to 
liberty is unquestionably, a right to private property least qualified 
by a:rbitra:ry limits and exclusions, for it is by this means only that 
the maximum diffusion of the power that springs from ownership may be 
achieved". (Oakeshott, 1962 :46). 
He believes that any mechanism sufficiently powerful to dissolve 
monopolies has the potential to be harmful. He seems rrerel y to wish 
to fragment large power-structures rather than to protect individuals 
or prevent small groups exercising and abusing small-scale ~r over 
others. 
This sterns fran his pessimism: for he believes that anyone who 
possesses any sort of ~r is likely at some stage to use that power 
to its maximum ill effect and the best one can do is to guard against 
the \\Urst of such uses. 
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Robert Nozick advocates a similar fragmentation of power and seems to 
place great stress on the protection of the individual. He writes, 
"The reason rights cane to be so central to political philosophy, 
although they are not the central rroral phenarena, is that the state 
is demarcated as the 0rgan nnnopolising the (legitimate) use of force. 
It is in this danain of the exertion of force, interpersonally as well 
as politically, that rights play the central nnral r8le, and talk of 
rights canes rrost easily. '!here are higher and rrore refined rroral 
notions. 'lb complain as some do at the crudity and bluntness of 
rights and of their centrality in political philosophy, ignores the 
fact that the use of force itself, the political differentia with 
which rights deal, is no less crude and blunt." (Nozick, 1981:503). 
And later, he defines a person's rights as "a function of how he ought 
to be treated and how others ought to be treated with regard to their 
behaviour towards him. " (Nozick, 1981 :56 3) • 
My rights are not merely another way of describing what others ought 
to do to me. My right is: what I am justified in forcing others to do 
or not to do to me. It is part of my rroral duty say, not to interfere 
with others to cause them to provide me with what I need or want or to 
prevent them behaving in ways which displease me e.g. criticizing or 
parodying my rrost finnly held beliefs, although it is perhaps the case 
they ought or ought not do those things. Rights are, according to 
Nozick, spheres of action within which one may not be forced - even to 
·do the rrora1ly correct thing. 
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The state's action is restricted to the protection of rights for two 
reasons. First, since the only morally justifiable use of force is in 
the enforcerrent of rights and the state has a :monopoly of force and 
characteristically uses this force when it acts. Furthenoore, this 
fact about it means that it is dangerous, easily turned to evil or 
misguided purposes. Its activity, therefore, must be limited in 
scope, well-advertised and rule-governed. Although it is impOrtant to 
bear in mind the logical distinction between the dichotanies 
"strong/lEak" governnent and "limited/extensive" government; and 
ineffectual governnent is never desirable, it is nevertheless the case 
as Oakeshott says that limited government will best be maintained if 
it is not given too much power and if there are clearly detennined 
sph&es in which it has no influence. oakeshott avoids talk of rights 
but his prescription is otherwise strikingly similar to Nozick's 
belief that the state's action should be limited to preventing 
interferences with individuals' rights. It would not need to be 
particularly ~rful or sophisticated to do this and only wrongdoers 
would be vulnerable to its mistakes. 
This is to assume that people's actions can be separated into 
non-conflicting spheres. 
Reich writes "One of the functions of property is to draw a boundary 
be~ public and private power. Property draws a circle around the 
activities of each private individual or organization. Within that 
circle, the owner has a greater freedcm than without .•• he is the 




'rhus property perfonns the function of maintaining independence, 
dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within which the 
majority has to yield to the owner. Whim, caprices, irrationality and 
anti-social activities are given the protection of the law". 
(Macpherson, 1978:180). 
This brings us to the more fundarrental of the neo-liberals' objections 
to the link between collectivization of property and unification of 
purposes. They say that unifonnity of purposes is the goal of 
collectivization of property and a pre-requisite for the harmonious 
functioning of a unified econany but that it is not possible, not 
necessary for hannony and freedom, and not desirable. 
Concerning its possibility, ~l<)Zick writes ''We may distinguish am:mg 
the following theses: 
I. For each person there is a kind of life that objectively is the 
best for him. 
(a) People are similar enough, so that there is one kind of life 
which objectively is the best for each of them. 
(b) People are different, so that there is not one kind of life 
which objectively is the best for everyone, and 
(i) '!he different kinds of life are similar enough so that 
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there is one kind of ccmmmity (meeting certain 
constraints) which objectively is the best for 
eve:ryone. 
(ii) The different kinds of life are so different that there 
is 'not one kind of ccmnunity (meeting certain 
constraints) which objectively is the best for 
everyone. 
II. For each person, so far as objective criteria of gcx::rlness can 
tell (in so far as trese exist), there is a wide range of very 
different kinds of life that tie as best: no one is objectively 
better for him than any other in the range, and no one within the 
range is objectively better than any other. And there is not one 
community which objectively is the best for the living of each 
selection set fran the family of sets of not objectively inferior 
lives." (Nozick, 1974:310) 
Nozick asserts that either I. (b) (ii) or II is true, because people 
are ve:ry different in their temperarrent, abilities and values. He 
asks one to imagine a range of people including Elizabeth Taylor, 
Wittgenstein, Gandhi, Freud, Ayn Rand, Einstein, Lenny Bruce, Bobby 
Fischer and oneself. He stresses the implausibility of finding one 
set of utopian goals which will be the best for each of these people. 
Utopias differ and when one considers with horror how badly off one 
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would be in the utopias of say - Plato, Marx, Buddha and Barbara 
cartland., one ought to consider the possibility that they and their 
follO\Ers ~uld not be happy in one's own utopia. 'lberefore it seems 
impossible that there could be one consistent set of goals with which 
everyone oould identify (or even with which a majority could 
identify), and that a system which requires such cohesion could never 
get off the ground or if it did, it could only do so with a great deal 
of psychological and physical coercion. 4 
Two questions arise: it is possible that many people, including same 
of those mentioned above, would not be happy if Nozick's principles of 
justice were put into practice. What makes his system different fran 
other utopias? He describes his ·"utopia" as "a framework for utopias, 
a place where people are at liberty to join voluntarily to pursue and 
attenpt to realize their awn vision of the good life in the ideal 
ccmmmi ty but where no-one can impose his utopian vision upon others. " 
(P. 312.) 
leaving aside for a rrorrent the question of whether this could be 
realized in practice, it is difficult to see how anyone except a 
nonananHic could object to it as an ideal. Nozick' s objection to 
other utopias, on the other hand, is that even if realized, they are 
unlikely to suit nore than a small minority. In this I believe he 
misjudges several utopias. In oontrast to his image of utopias as 
nonochrane scenarios where everyone has the same life-style and values 
many utopias - such as Voltaire's Eldorado and Marx's "pure cannunism" 
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focus on liberation. There citizens are provided with the training 
and means to realize any or all of their talents and to pursue a 
variety of interests. 'lbey, of course, are expected to agree that 
such "liberation" and "self-fulfilment" are valuable but these could 
be seen as meta-ideals in the way that Nozick' s approval of 
non-interference is a meta-ideal. 
Secondly, while it may be conceded that people as they are now, would 
be 'lmhappy in a particular utopia, even that such a utopia would be 
objectively bad for them, it may be objected that part of the utopian 
progranme would be to create people with the right sort of desires. 
This sort of objection has often been condemned as opening the way to 
nightmarish totalitarianism: for instance in Aldous Huxley's Brave New 
World and it is indeed dangerous but desires are to sane extent 
detennined by education and parental influence. !n Nozick' s framework 
for utopia, are parents entitled to bring their children up with 
inclinations which make them choose their own utopia? For instance, 
to choose a carmume in which drug-abuse and perversion are rife; in an 
Amish camnuni ty which ignores the twentieth century; in a tradi tiona! 
Japanese oarnmunity in which it is good to die for one's emperor? Such 
influences are like! y to 1imi t the children's choices. Why not have 
an education system which is likely to produce the freest and happiest 
people? It is not inconceivable that the criteria for choosing such 
an education system would be 
(1) the one which caused them to value things which brought than 
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least into conflict with other :people and, if possible meant that 
they helped others in helping themselves. (I recognise that 
these might in certain circumstances be incanpatible injunctions. 
A rrore detailed version would include a priority principle.) 
(2) the one which caused people to value what would best realize 
their true natures1 or. (if they do not have "natures") given 
their potentialities, which would cause them to pursue the goals 
which would give the greatest satisfaction. 
Insofar as character is moulded by outside forces, it seems reasonable 
to do this. H~ver, anyone taking part in this argument must believe 
that there is an important element of free choice - and to try to 
control this is to decrease a person's freedcrn. Further, there are 
purely practical problems in designing the optimum society or 
education system and discovering the best means to bring these about. 
Nozick writes "Even if one kind of society is best for all, how are we 
to find out what this society is like?" [Nozick, 1974 : 312] 
Considering the enonrous ccmplexi ty of persons and interpersonal 
relations it is unlikely that a blueprint could ever be drawn up. 
Furthenrore, it would be irrational to put one's faith in any 
blueprint considering the degree of certainty that it is the right one 
which is necessary to outweigh the danger of its going wrong and the 
awfulness of the means necessary to bring it about. 
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Hayek writes that there is a camon confusion which treats a national 
econort¥ on the Irodel of a household or fann econany, as "a canplex of 
activities by which a given set of means is allocated in accordance 
with a tmitary plan cnrong the competing ends according to their 
relative i.rrportance •• ·• What is ccmronly called a social or national 
econany is in this sense not a single economy but a network of many 
interlaced econanies ••• its activities are not governed by a single 
scale or hierarchy of ends." [Hayek, 1973 : 107] 
His contention is that a ccmron hierarchy of ends is not necessary 
for, nor even favourable to a hannonious and happy society. He 
continues, "The great society arose through the discovery that men can 
live together in peace and mutual! y benefitting each other without 
agreeing on the particular aims which they severally pursue. The 
discovery that by substituting abstract rules of conduct for 
obligatory concrete ends made it possible to extend the order of peace 
beyond the small groups pursuing the same ends ..• It was the simple 
recognition that different persons had different uses for the same 
things, and that often each of these two individuals would benefit if 
he obtained sarrething the other had, in return for his giving the 
other what he needed." [Hayek, 1973 : 109] 
Far fran different interests causing clashes, "The parties are in fact 
the ItDre likely to benefit from exchange the ItDre their needs differ." 
It is the collective system which causes conflict, since "so long as 
collaboration presupposes ccmron purposes, people with different aims 
- 93 -
are necessarily enemies, who may fight each other for the same means, 
only the intrcxluction of barter made it possible for the different 
individuals to be of use to each other without agreeing on the 
ult.imate ends." (Hayek, 1973:110) 
Nor need they knew much about the ideals of the others. All they need 
to knew is the nature and intensity of other people's desires and what 
they have prcxluced. This infonnation is conveyed to them via the 
market, they do not rely on an omniscient and ideally just individual 
or group measuring needs and deciding on means to satisfy them. 
Hayek's rules of just conduct can be likened to Nozick' s 
side-constraints. Both place clear limits on what an individual may 
do (i.e. not use another as a rreans without his consent) but leave him 
free to choose his cwn goals, to do as he likes with hi.nself and his 
property and to contract as he likes with other free agents. There is 
no conflict of interests because each has a sphere in which he is the 
final arbiter of what happens. Although different people may want to 
achieve different things as long as they act only on their own 
property these goals will be compatible. Of course, ·their ends will 
usually be incompatible if they focus on the sarre physical means. 
The strongest attacks on collectivization of means and ends maintain 
that far fran being necessary to freedan, it is the deadly enemy of 
freedan. Oakeshott writes "a man is not free unless he enjoys a 
proprietacy right over his personal capacities and labour. And yet no 
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such right exists unless there are many potential employers of his 
iabour. The freedom which separates a man fran slavery is nothing but 
a freedcm to choose and to move among autonarous, independent 
organisations." [oakeshott, 1962 : 46] 
oakeshott recognises that ownership of means of production gives one 
~r but he thinks a w:>rker is freer if he can boycott an 
organisation which doen't please him than if he has to accept the 
tenns of a single employer, whether this be the state or a private · 
person. 
Nozick expresses a similar but slightly more general point, when he 
writes, "If there is a diverse range of conmuni ties, then (putting it· 
roughly) more persons will be able to cc::.roo closer to how they wish to 
live, than if there is only one kind of camrunity." 
[Nozick, 1974 : 309] 
This is so for several reasons. One is freer if one can choose 
arrongst several possible courses of action. And one is more likely to 
be happy since there is a higher probability that one's absolute 
favourite ·will be arrong one's actual choices. F\lrthenrore, as seems 
to be the case, different things make different people happy. lastly, 
diversity is enriching since it means people pursue and use different 
kinds of things so there is less pressure on particular resources. 
Nozick points out that this is an environment in which experimentation 
occurs which is valuable fran the individual's point of view - since 
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he can change if his project fails or bores him - and fran society's 
point of view - since the chances increase that scmeone will hit upon 
a still nore satisfying way of life. 
However such diversity only brings freedan if it is easy to nove fran 
one role to another. A society in which individuals were trapped in a 
variety of positions might give the ilrpression of enriching diversity 
but would be diagnosed by a Marxist as one oppressed by division of 
labour and inequality and would, in fact, be no less restrictive than 
its less colourful alternative. 
Nozick describes a fanciful situation in Which a fashion emerges of 
selling or giving away rights in oneself- such as the right to decide 
What drugs one can take~ t}le right to detennine one's permi. tted node 
of sexual activity~ the right to decide how much of one's incare is 
used for purposes one does not choose~ the right to decide Whether 
and whcm to fight and kill. The administration of these interpersonal 
possessions becanes unwieldy. There is a vast convention at Which 
people buy and sell and each person winds up with exact! y one share in 
each right in each person, including himself o 
He writes, "People view the exchange as an absolutely even trade. 
Before the exchange a person has one full share in himself, and not a 
partial share in any other person • o • In exchange for this he gets a 
1/S + nth share in each of the other S+n-1 persons in the society, 
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plus the same share in himself • • • People say, and think that when 
everybody owns everybody, nobody owns anybody." [Nozick, 1974 : 286] 
This society - Nozick seems to be saying - is trore or less like the 
actual societies of today where majority decisions can interfere with 
personal rights. Oddly enough, the situation as Nozick describes it 
is one which he cannot call illegitimate as it has been brought into 
being by a series of just transfers. However, he derives a very 
similar situation along a very different route: not by voluntary 
exchange of rights but starting fran a slave-owner's absolute control 
over his slaves, one of which is you. The slave-owner gives his ten 
thousand slaves~ except you, the vote on important issues such as how 
all are to behave, dress, \\Ork and so on. Later you are allowed to 
vote in cases of deadlock. Eventually you have the same status as the 
others but your vote still makes a difference only in cases of 
deadlock. At what point, he asks rhetorically, do you cease to be a 
slave? 
Nozick's point see:ns to be that: 
(1) The right to have a say in how others behave is far less valuable 
than the right to behave as you choose. As became clear in the 
last chapter one is not necessarily more free the trore questions 
one can choose about. The importance of the choice also counts 
in assessing its contribution to one's freedan. Freedans are 
more important the bigger difference they make to one's life. 
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Since it is a matter of relative indifference to me what other 
people do behind the closed doors of their bedrCXIIIS or churches -
influence in these matters is of little use to one. 
(2) You have a ve:cy little influence if you vote in a large group. 
(3) It is canpletely unnecessary and unpleasant. People end up being 
forced to do what they don't want to do when it would be 
perfectly possible for them to do as they please (with certain 
limitations). 
If (1) and (3) are true and (4) being free is to be able to do what 
one wants, then the exchange in Nozick's sto:cy is not an absolutely 
even trade. 
As regards (4), it is usually the case that what one wants to do-is 
closer to what is objectively in one's best interest, than are the 
decisions of the majority since one is usually in the best position to 
judge what will make one happy, and one certainly cares rrore about 
finding out. Even when the two care apart, when what one wants to do 
is clearly not in one's best interest, many writers consider it an 
insult to treat one as if this were the case. Isaiah Berlin writes 
"To threaten a man with persecution unless he sul:rnits to a life in 
which he exercises no choices of his goals, to block before him eve:cy 
door but one, no matter how noble the prospect upon which it opens, or 
how benevolent the rrotives of those who arrange this, is to sin 
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against the truth that he is a man, a being with a life of his own to 
live." [Berlin, 1969 : 127] 
It seE!ItLS then, that to maximize happiness, freedcm and dignity we must 
give people as much au.tonort¥ as possible. Private property is the 
best guarantee of such autonaey since private property rights entail a 
duty on the part of others to respect as inviolable a physical area 
aromd one. 'nley also render one independent of others for the 
necessities of life and employment. Private property is private means 
which can be put to private ends. 
However the arguments in support of private property in this chapter 
(that it is necessary for the protection of important freedans) seem 
to have two further consequences: 
(1) That if possible eve:cyone should have such a sphere of 
inviolability. 
(2) That a:rrt individual's sphere should not be too large since beyond 
a certain point the ~r property brings is not rrerely the power 
to carey out purposes central to one's own developrent, but to 
manipulate other people. One is secured in freedom of choice in 
matters which are trivial to one's interests at the expense of 
the loss of irrportant freedans on the part of others. 
This seems to argue for a more egalitarian distribution than the 
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writers considered here would accept. I imagine there are two main 
objections they would raise. The first is that the state 'WOUld have 
to be very ~rful if it ~re to maintain say, an upper and lower 
limit on how much may be owned, and that this power would pose a 
threat. However it would be far less powerful than a state which 
actually owned all the property. Its activity could remain 
rule-governed so that one would not have to rely entirely on the 
discretion of one fallible individual or group. 
A1 trough it would be a risk it would be rational to take such a risk 
since the likelihood of private individuals acquiring and abusing 
great ~r is higher. At least, public officials would be botmd by 
the constitution, the press, the polls, and their sense of duty not to 
abuse their ~r. This may sound foolishly optimistic but there must 
be a difference between private and public people._ Milton Friedman 
says ''When ~ talk of a political market, we talk of public servants 
and this suggests that they are seJ:Ving the public. That is an 
utterly false distinction. We are human beings and we all pursue our 
own interests." [Friedman, 1976 : 7] However there is a great 
difference be~ what it is in the self-interest of a private person 
and a public setvant to do. Furthenrore, the law restricts the 
activities of the latter to a far greater extent, and to be legal, if 
not to be moral - cuts a: lot of ice with most people. 
A second objection is that maintenance of a pattern (even as crude a 
one as I have envisaged) involves interference with people's rights. 
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If saneone is allowed to keep sane property to ensure his 
inviolability, this project is defeated if he is forbidden to inq:>rove 
it or give it away or sell it, which, Nozick says, is what taxation 
anoun.ts to. 
However, it is irrp::>rtant to note the nature of the justification for 
private property given here. It is not justified because it is a 
natural right or because it is the result of free arrl fair actions. 
It is justified as an instrument to protecting autonany. That it does 
so is not a necessary truth. Iri fact it is unlikely that the 
haphazard "--rkings of a completely laissez-faire economy could always 
protect freedan, and when it fails to do so, the system must be 
adjusted. The neo-liberals recognise that control over things is 
equivalent to power over people. They cannot at the srure time 
maintain that use of one's private property is hannless and 
self-regarding and that therefore any regulation is a violation of 
their rights. 
1. I understand there to be a great and confusing variety of usage 
of the tenn "Liberal". Peter Collins has IX>inted out to me that 
roughly "American conservative" neans "Classical English liberal" 
and American "Liberal" neans European "socialist but not 
carrarunist". That there has been a shift in the connotation of 
"liberalism" where it once suggested protection of negative 
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liberties including a free-market economy, it has (in sane 
people's minds) c::cma to be associated with welfare state. The 
writers I deal with in this chapter have been called conservative 
and libertarian. My choice of "neo-liberal", therefore, is 
fairly arbitrary.. Liberals of the other sort, IM:>rkin, Rawls 
etc. I shall call, following C B Macpherson, "revisionist 
liberals". 
2. Oakeshott seems to be operating with the notion of freedan Berlin 
called "negative" which he defined as "simply the area with which 
a man can do what he wants. If I am prevented by other persons 
from doing what I \'.Silt I am to that degree unfree". 
[Berlin, 1969] 
3. By "utopia" I mean a society or a description of a society which 
is perfect and stable and is taken as the collective historical 
goal of a group. Karl Popper derrcnstrates the plausibility of 
the utopian attitude to politics. "All politics consists of 
actions; and these actions will be rational only if they pursue 
sane end ••. Thus it appears that as a preliminary to any 
rational political action we must first attempt to beoome as 
clear as possible about our ultimate political ends; e.g. the 
kind of state which we should consider best; and only afte:rwards 
can we begin to detennine the means which may best help . us to 
realize this state or, to move slowly towards it, taking it as 
the aim of the historical process which we may to sane extent 
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influence and steer towards the goal selected." 
[Popper, 1947 : 358] 
4. Essentially, this is the same point as Oakeshott makes in "On 
Being Conservative" when he says " ••• if it is boring to have to 
listen to dreams of others being recounted, it is insufferable to 
be forced to re-enact them." [Oakeshott, 1962 : 187] 
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CHAPTER V 
THE HYBRID THIDRISTS: SUGGESTED COMProMISES 
In this chapter I discuss three "hybrid" views of property: 
Alan Ryan's utilitarianism and the theories of John Rawls and 
Ronald Dworkin. In spite of the fact that Rawls and Dworkin seek to 
distance themselves fran utilitarianism by anphasizing rights which 
cannot be overridden in the name of utility, I have grouped the three 
tOCjether because they all attempt to avoid the counter-intuitive 
features of libertarianism and Marxism. 'Ihey have as a ccmron ground 
the belief that there is no natural right to own property; and that 
what property rights there ought to be is a matter to be decided by 
assessing their usefulness in producing happiness or conditions of 
freedom. They agree, further, that it is not unequivocally or in all 
circumstances the case that one system will produce these better than 
another. They share the aim of respecting individual choice, in 
particular by making government neutral between the goals of its 
g'itizens. They also accept various errpirical assurrptions such as 
diminishing marginal utility, and that incentives of material gain and 
security are conducive to productivity. 'Ihey conclude, tentatively, 
that the best system is probably one in which private property is 
allowed but where governrrent retains the power to tax, to redistribute 
and to counter hannful tendencies in the market. utilitarianism takes 
as its single guiding principle: "that action is best, which procures 
the greatest happiness for the greatest nmnbers, and that worst, 
which, in like manner, occasions misery. "1 
utilitarianism has been reproached for neglecting rights or for 
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treating them as merely ins~ntal to utility and hence dispensable. 
However, this sort of objection may have no force in the case of 
property rights. [Alan Ryan, 1984 : 1] writes: "the sort of rights 
which it seems necessary to accord people to accamrodate liberal and 
humanitarian intuitions are not best seen as property rights, and if 
"-'9 reject utilitarianism because of its inability to ground rights we 
want to accord people either for no reason, or out of a principle of 
respect for persons, or whatever - this is no great weakness in a 
utilitarian account of property rights since property rights are not 
basic rights." He continues: "Any notion of a right over things 
which is rich enough to be the concept of a property right seens to 
require the owner to have pao.ers over things which nothing but an 
artificial construction or convention can produce." [Ryan, 1984 4] 
By this, Ryan appears to be referring to the fact that while 
"property" involves sorre notion of exclusive use, we are not connected 
to things in any obvious or equal way which could be used to argue 
that there is a natural or human right to control an object and 
exclude others in the way that it might be said that \lie have natural 
or human rights over our persons. 
If property rights are conventional devices justified by their 
utilitarian consequences, they can be changed whenever utility demands 
it. The non-existence, abolition or adaption of legal property rights 
is not, therefore, an infringerrent of natural rights. 
The characteristic dilemna of utilitarianism is be~en the 
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subordinate principles of equality and security. Since utilitarians 
accept the principle that "each is to count for one and no-one for 
nore than one", and the empirical assumption that roost goods yield a 
diminishing marginal utility, it follows that the distribution which 
produces roost utility· is likely to be an equal one. On the other 
hand, "The essence of property is security~ the whole point of 
inventing property rights is to secure people in the use and enjoyment 
of things." [Ryan, 1984 : 5] This assurance is the best 
encourage.rent to productivity. "But the process of production and 
distribution left to itself will probably produce great inequalities 
of ownership." [Ryan, 1984 : 51 
Justice, on this view, places no constraints on what the governrrent 
may do in maximizing utility. In principle, it may tax or expropriate 
as it sees fit. However there are several practical considerations. 
Bentham stresses the point that the disappointrrent of actual 
expectations can produce greater unhappiness than the failure to 
inprove conditions in unexpected ways. 2 People expect to keep their 
earnings and children to inherit their parents' wealth and these 
expectations ought to be taken into account. However, the appropriate 
response to this situation may be: to allow current expectations to 
be fulfilled but to ensure that similar expectations do not develop in 
the future. For instance, one might pass a law now to the effect that 
people who are already parents may bequeath their wealth to their 
children but that children may not pass their wealth on. Secrndly, 
just as people have expectations of keeping their property, tenants 
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have expectations of staying in their houses for a reasonable rent and 
ercq;>loyees of keeping their jobs and receiving reasonable increases. 
If expectations are important, these too should be respected. It is 
difficult to detennine how much weight such considerations should be 
given, but in the interests of preventing a sense of resentment and 
injustice, if it bec::x:nes necessary to abolish a kind of property 
right, sane effort should be made to conpensate those who lose out. 
Another consideration is the need to maintain incentives for general 
prosperity. Alan Ryan suggests taxing inherited wealth harshly and 
earned wealth less harshly. This would give people an incentive to 
work and a disincentive to give 100ney to the wealthy. · It also neans 
that productive resources are less likely to pass out of the hands of 
the efficient and energetic and into the hands of the lazy and 
incompetent. 
Lastly, Ryan writes, "If the utilitarian point of inventing property 
rights is to enlarge the range of choice and to create security, it 
may be that we ought to break up the property rights characteristic of 
a capitalist economy on much the same grotmds as those rights were 
intially justified." [Ryan, 1984 (A) : 12] He suggests, for example, 
separating ownership of capital assets fran the right to choose the 
managers of those assets or the right to receive dividends fran the 
right to share in the capital gains. 
Perhaps, the IOOst influential and comprehensive work in political 
theory to appear in recent years is John Rawls' Theory of Justice. He 
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rejects utilitarianism. In fact, he sets out to produce an 
alternative m::>ral and political theory to utilitarianism which has a 
similar simplicity, efficiency and m::>ral force as the latter without 
what he sees as its objectionable feature: that of failing to take 
seriously the difference be'b.een persons. [Rawls, 1972 : 27] 
Rawls says that part of the appeal of utilitarianism stems fran the 
sirnplici ty of the link it established between the two nnst crucial 
m::>ral notions: the right and the good. It defines the good 
independently of the right, as happiness or satisfaction of desire and 
then defines the right action as the one which proouces the nost 
happiness. As a result, it claims, it is never ambivalent. There is 
no roan for genuine m::>ral dilenmas. There may be empirical 
disagreements about what will, in fact, produce the nnst happiness but 
there is a clear noral framework into which empirical details can be 
slotted. 
Furthenoc>re, on the analogy of prudential behaviour for an individual, 
since it is often rational to sacrifice a small aiOOUnt of -well-being 
tCxlay for a great deal of happiness tarorrow, and indeed it is 
considered irrational to attach much -weight to a particular date, so 
it seems to be just not to prefer the well-being of one person to that 
of another and so to cause a .small aiOOUnt of suffering to one if this 
is necessary to bring about a great deal of -well-being in another. 
Utilitarians, says Rawls, often use the IOOdel of rational choice for 
one person such as an impartial God-like observer. However, as Rawls 
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writes: "There is no reason to suppose that the principles which 
should regulate an association of men is simply an extension of the 
principle of choice for one man. On the contrary, if we assurre that 
the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of 
that thing, and the plurality of distinct persons with separate 
systems of ends is an essential feature of hmnan societies, we should 
not ~ct the principles of social choice to be utilitarian." 
[Rawls, 1972 : 26] 
The death, suffering or loss of liberty of one individual cannot be 
canpensated for by the well-being of any number of others because 
there is no single consciousness which experiences the net gain and so 
could agree to undergo the suffering: there is one who suffers and 
others who gain. Justice prohibits the sacrifice of one for another. 
This guides Rawls in his choice of a Kantian procedural trodel from 
which to derive his principles. Although utilitarianism is one of the 
theories considered it is less likely to be chosen than it would be in 
the rejected Ideal Observer roodel. 
Rawls chooses a contractual model since he sees society as an 
association of rren and WOiren for their mutual benefit. It best 
CCitll1ailds their suppport and treats them with respect if it restricts 
their liberty only where they have agreed (or ~uld have agreed if 
they could have been asked) to the restriction. Hobbes and Locke 
justified the power of the state as the result of rights surrendered 
by rren in an original social contract. It was unclear whether this 
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c:x:mtract was supposed to have been an historical event. Rawls' 
contract is explicitly hypothetical. As I argued in my first chapter, 
it is ~sible for an actual contract whic\1 is universally binding 
to occur because it would require the convening of people frcm all 
places and especial! y r all tines. Even contracts between 
conterrporaries in a circumscribed area (renewed with each newcamr 
perhaps) are invariably unfair as some start with great advantages 
from which to bargain. 
It is reasonable to ask of Rawls' hypothetical contract, why one 
should feel bound by an agreement which no-one, let alone oneself, 
ever entered into? Rawls' response is that it is a powerful heuristic 
device whose point "is simply to make vivid to ourselves the 
restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments for 
principles of justice and therefore on those principles themselves." 
[Rawls, 1972 : 18] 
The parties to this contract are in the "Original Position", behind "a 
veil of ignorance". They do not know what generation or social 
circumstances they will be born into; nor do they know their class or 
race or level of intelligence; their talents; their psychological 
propensities or even their conception of the good. They do not know 
particular details about the society they will be born into, but they 
are aware of general psychological, sociological and econcmic data. 
They are nutually disinterested and rational. That is, they are not 
envious or especially generous (behind the veil, that is, although 
.l 
- 110-
they know they may develop these traits later). Each wishes to 
maximize his own prospects but knows he could be anyone. 
Altrough they are primarily concerned with looking after their~ 
interests, they are just. They understand the implications of making 
a cxmni trnent and are prepared to stand by it. However they recognise 
that certain agreements may be well-nigh impossible to keep and others 
may only be kept at the cost of great psychological strain. 
Rawls believes that if such people could reach a clear consensus, the 
principles they chose as the rrost rational, ~d be principles of 
justice for us; since they are what each of us would accept if we were 
not prejudiced by rrorally ·irrelevant infonnation such as: that being 
stupid or lazy we were likely to benefit fran a welfare state~ or 
that being brilliant, anti-social and energetic we were rrore likely to 
benefit from a systan of free enterprise. This infonnation is 
irrelevant as universalizability is generally considered to be the 
essence of roorality: the rightness of a Iroral law should be equally 
apparent fran all points of view. Who the people are and how many is 
irrelevant since each person is equally rational and equally ignorant. 
Anyone can, in a thought experiment, step behind the veil. If one 
accepts that the veil of ignorance does reflect deeply held rroral 
principles, the question of justice is greatly simplified. It is 
easier to make a rational choice with conviction and sincerity than to 
make a rooral choice where one can never be sure whether selfish biases 
are not masquerading as pious principles. 
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The principles Rawls believes will be chosen are: 
"First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the rrost 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties canpatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all. 
Second Principle: Social and econanic inequalities are to be arranged 
so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least 
advantaged (the difference principle) and (b) attached to offices and 
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
The Priority Rule: The principles of justice are to be ranked in 
lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the 
sake of liberty ... fair opportunity is prior tO the difference 
principle." [Rawls, 1972 : 302] 
The priority of liberty, however, only cares into effect once a 
certain (fairly low) level of welfare has been reached. I shall 
discuss the details and justification of the two principles and the 
priority rule. 
It is i.nportant to note what Rawls rreans here by "basic liberties". 
Naturally if the maximization of liberty is to take priority and the 
second principle is to be of any relevance at all, the liberties to be 
maximized must leave titre and roc:m for other factors. 
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Altb:>ugh he recognises the freedom to own property as a genuine 
liberty, it is not among those which he wishes to maximise. The 
"basic liberties" are freedom of conscience, freedom of the person, 
political freedan and protection by the rule of law. 
Furthennore he makes an interesting and significant distinction. He 
writes, "The inability to take advantage of one's rights and 
opporttmities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of 
means generally, is scmetimes counted am:mg the constraints definitive 
of liberty. I shall not however, say this, but rather I shall think 
of these things as affecting the worth of liberty, the value to the 
individual of the rights that the first principle defines. 
[Rawls, 1972 : 204] 3 
This seE!ItlS a valid distinction to make if it is true, as it seems to 
be, that if you maximise liberty, it will be equally distributed. (At 
least, the "basic liberties" nentioned above) . However, it is quite 
possible that his liberty is worth rrore to the worst-off person if 
wealth is distributed unequally. 
The second principle deals with the distribution of wealth. Rawls 
believes that the representative citizen behind the veil will choose a 
policy of maximin". That is, he will choose to ensure that if he is 
the worst-off rrember of society, his circumstances will be least bad. 
Rawls thinks he will take this option for three reasons: 
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"(1) There must be sene reason for sharply discounting estimates of 
• • • probabilities. 
(2) The person choosing has a conception of the good such that he. 
cares very little, if anything, for what he might gain above the 
minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the 
maximin rule. 
(3) 'Ihe rejected alternatives have outcanes that one can hardly 
accept." [Rawls, 1972 : 154] 
I would object to this that the parties are concerned to do the best 
for themselves and not relative to the rest of society and therefore, 
soould apply these principles directly. I agree that they would be 
irrational to gamble with the necessities of life, ignorant as they 
are of the odds. However, if there is a point up to which it matters 
very much heM much one has, and beyond which it matters very little, 
why imagine that this point should coincide exactly with the minimum 
ensured by the difference principle. If the point is lower, the 
rational strategy may be to ensure that minimum and gamble as regards 
the remainder. A1 though the people behind the veil are aware of no 
other desires than the desire to be healthy and canfortable, they know 
that there is a good chance that their life projects will require 
substantial amounts of resources: for a lengthy education programre, 
to buy a business or a house; or to travel extensively. The chance 
of achieving this (however small) may be worth rrore to them than the 
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certainty of a little extra comfort. 
On the other hand, if the point is above the minimum insured by the 
difference principle it may be worth risking one's life on the chance 
of securing the minimlm needed for a bearable life. Of course, the 
parties do not know the nature of the particular society they will be 
born into. There seens to be nothing, ~, stopping them fran 
including oonditional clauses in their fo:nnulation of the principles 
of justice. Although it would be less elegant, it may be nore 
rational to stipulate say that different conditions are to apply 
depending on the degree of affluence of the society. 
Nor does this jar with our direct intuitions of justice. In a society 
where a majority of people are severely malnourished and many starve 
to death, it may not be appropriate to continue raising the position 
of the worst-off. It may be better to concentrate resources on a few. 
Converse! y, in a very rich society, there may be other ideals which 
take precedence over the continual improvement of the lot of the 
worst-off. 
Rawls compares the difference principle with our rroral intuitions and 
claims that it reflects our commitment to regard all natural talents 
as collective assets. [Rawls, 1972 : 178] Since, he says, no one 
deserves his natural advantages or the inccme that he earns with them, 
he cannot object to having them partial! y taxed for another's welfare. 
The worst-off could object to being made even worse-off for the 
- 115 -
benefit of those who are already advantaged. 
The difference principle is preferred to nore egalitarian positions 
since the parties are not envious and so 'WOUld consider it irrational 
to accept a lower degr,ee of welfare than necessary just in order to 
level eve:cyone off. 
It is preferred to other principles such as ensuring a minimum of 
welfare or weighting equality and utility against each other since, 
Rawls says, it is precise and it matches our vague intuitions as well 
as they, but is rrore useful in producing definite guidelines for 
action. [Rawls, 1972 : 317] 
An essentially similar concern underlies Rawls' insistence on the 
priority rule. He wishes to avoid the snags of intuitionism or the 
belief that there are a group of first principles which cannot be 
ordered or reconciled and which do not provide clear guidelines. 
His reason for stressing liberty or believing that parties in the· 
original position ~uld give it priority is that beyond a minimum 
needed for life and canfort, increase in material resources is not to 
be preferred to liberty since resources are of 1i ttle value if they 
cannot be used to carry out one's chosen life plan. 
Recognising their equality and plurality•they opt for institutions 
which are neutral as regards the good life and which leave the 
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individual the maximum liberty to live his own life without 
interfering with others. 
Rawls' principles of justice do not favour a socialist or a private 
property economy. He .writes "Which of these systems and the many 
intermediate forms most fully answers to the requireinents of justice 
cannot, I think, be detennined in advance. There is presmnably no 
general answer to this question, since it depends in large part upon 
the traditions, institutions, and social forces of each country and 
its particular historical circumstances. 'Ibe theory of justice does 
not include these matters." [Rawls, 1972 : 274] 
In this, he echoes the consequentialist aspect of utilitarianism. The 
question of whether property should be private or ccmnon is not a 
question of justice or morality but an empirical question of which 
system in particular circumstances cares closest to realizing a more 
fundamental ideal. For Rawls, the ideals are liberty and equality as 
expressed in the difference principle. 
He believes that "perfect canpetition is a perfect procedure with 
respect to efficiency" and "a further and rrore significant advantage 
of a market system is that, given the requisite background 
institutions, it is consistent with equal liberties and fair equality 
of opportnnity." [Rawls, 1972 : 272] He also believes that the 
market is an excellent rredium of information (like Hayek) and that it 
provides incentives to increase productivity. 
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On the other ·hand, "There is with reason strong objection to the 
ccxrq;>etitive detennination of total inCC~Ie, since this ignores the 
clailns of need and an appropriate standard of life. From the 
starrlpoint of the legislative stage it is rational to insure oneself 
and one's descendants· against these contingencies of the market." 
[Rawls 1972 : 271] 
He sees the gove:rnment as having four functions in correcting the 
effects of the market: (a) The allocative function which keeps the 
price system workably ccxrq;>etitive and prevents formation of 
unreasonable market power and identifies and collects suitable taxes; 
(b) '!be stabilization function maintains reasonably full employment 
and choice of occupations; (c) The transfer function maintains the 
sociai minimum; and (d) '!be distributive function ensures justice in 
distributive shares by means of taxation and necessary adjust:Irents in 
the rights of property - not so nmch to raise revenue as to correct 
gross inequalities and prevent concentrations of power detr~tal to 
liberty. 
Rawls' book has precipitated an enornous am:>unt of critical 
literature, to which it is impossible to do justice. Much of this 
criticism concerns the constitution of the original position. However 
I consider his conception to be profound and illuminating. It 
captures the objectivity essential to m::>rality and appears to be a 
genuine improverrent on utilitarianism. 
Probably the m::>st controversial aspect of his theory and the one nost 
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relevant to this discussion, is the difference principle. I shall 
discuss criticism of his theory of distributive justice fran Nozick's 
libertarian position and then I shall canpare it with a similarly 
hybrid theory, namely, that of I:M::>rkin. 
Nozick imagines ten Robinson Crusoes \110rking in isolation each on his 
own island. By chance, they happen to make contact by radio and 
discover that sane are doing well and others doing badly. He says it 
would be ridiculous · for the disadvantaged ones to declare that the 
situation was unfair and to demand assistance fran those who are 
better off. He then asks why the fact of productive cooperation 
should make a difference. If the Robinson Crusoes freely decide to 
exchange particular natural or ready-made objects, there seems to be 
no reason to imagine that the inequality should suddenly becane unjust 
if it has not teen so before. If instead of objects they decided to 
exchange sezvices, there seems to be no difference either. Even in 
cases of fuller cooperation, it is not the case that it is impossible 
to distinguish anyone's contribution; nor does Rawls think it is, 
since he suggests paying the rrost productive individuals extra as an 
incentive. 
But the objection to inequality is not so Im.lch that :people receive 
rrore than they contribute (especially when the value of the 
contribution is detennined by how Im.lch others want it), but that 
:people start out with ~equal opportunities, that the differences in 
the contributions are rrore often the result of luck than anything 
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else. The objection questions their right exclusively to use and 
profit fran this gocx:l fortune. The difference between the isolated 
Crusoe and the cooperating group is not one of kind but of degree. 
People \\'Orking and 1i ving together are constantly reminded of their 
inequalities and this . is often a source of distress. Close contact 
also requires force to protect holdings which may give a nore vivid 
impression of the absence of liberties, but the wealthy Crusoes have 
no nore genuine claim to exclusive rights over their holdings than do 
their counterparts. 
Secondly, Nozick objects that it does not seem to follow fran the 
facts that G has X and F has Y and Y is nore than X, when there is a 
situation which could be brought into being in which there is a 
different distribution - that G is badly off because F is well-off, or 
that G suffers in order to maintain F's well-being. 
Peter Singer writes: "In the view of the laissez-faire theorists and 
sane other philosophers as well, freedan is not restricted and rights 
are not infringed by circumstances but only by deliberate human acts. 
This position makes, in my view, an nntenable rroral distinction 
be~ an overt act and an anission of an act. If we can act to 
alter circumstances but decide not to do so, then we must take 
responsibility for our omission just as we must take responsibility 
for our overt act. Therefore ciretnnstances which it is within our 
power to alter may limit our freedcrn as much as deliberate human 
acts." [Arthur and Shaw, 1978 : 216] 
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Whether or not F 1 s situation causes G 1 s situation (because it is prior 
and causally correlated) the fact that if, and only if, F 1 s situation 
were changed G 1 s would be changed means that those who fail to bring 
about this change are responsible for the status quo. 
Nozick agrees with Rawls that if objects and actions were as a whole 
like sane pie to be divided up, if the government were the official 
guardian of these resources, it might be that the fairest way for it 
to distribute them would be in accordance with the difference 
principle, but is this an accurate analogy? Nozick denies that it is 
appropriate to regard talent as manna which falls fran heaven and to 
treat where it -falls as irrelevant. 
Although he seems to agree that people do not dese:rve their talents he 
asks: "How might the point that differences in natural endownents are 
arbitrary fran a moral point of view function in an argurrent meant to 
establish that differences in holdings stemming from differences in 
natural assets ought to be nullified?" [Nozick, 1974 : 216] 
Michael Sandel writes on this point that even if Rawls could show that 
individuals do not deserve their talents : " •. it might still be that 
people \\ere entitled to them, and to what follows fran them. To show 
that individuals as individuals do not dese:rve to possess "their" 
assets is not necessarily to show that society as a whole does deserve 
or possess them." [Sandel, 1982 : 96] and "For Nozick, the absence of 
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desert creates a presumption in favour of letting assets lie where 
they fall, at least once it is accepted things do not carre into the 
world like manna fran heaven but come into being already attached to 
particular persons. For Rawls, on the other hand, the absence of 
individual desert creates a presumption in favour of regarding the 
distribution of talents as a conrnon asset • • • there is no reason to 
let assets and the benefits that flow fran than lie where they fall. 
This would be simply to incorporate and affinn the arbitrariness of 
nature." [Sandel, 1982 : 98] 
A final, disturbing objection fran Nozick is to· Rawls 1 statenent that 
if~ regard talents as collective assets, inequalities need not be 
eliminated as there is another way of dealing with than. Nozick asks: 
''What if there wasn't?" Regarding features of persons as collective 
resources seems to allow one to steer dangerously close to using 
persons as means to others 1 ends. 
These objections bring to light deep and genuine intuitions. They do 
not fully support Nozick 1 s conclusions as these also have 
counter-intuitive features but they make Rawls' position far less 
secure. I do not intend to discuss them i.mrediately but to deal with 
them together with similar objections raised in response to Dworkin 1 s 
theory. 
"Rawls most basic assumption is not that men have a right to certain 
liberties that Locke or Mill thought important, but they have a right 
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to equal respect and concern in the design of political institutions." 
[Dworkin, 1977 : 182] 
This right determines the constitution and use of the original 
position as a procedure for discovering principles of justice. It is 
not itself justified because it would be chosen by parties behind the 
veil. It is what justifies placing them there. 
Dworkin says that "a responsible government must be ready to justify 
anything it does. But normally it is sufficient justification, even 
for an act that limits liberty, that the act calculated to increase 
the general utility be calculated to produce m:>re overall benefit than 
hann." [Dworkin, 1977 : 191] But when individual citizens are said 
to have rights against the government it must mean that this sort of 
justification is not enough. "A right against the government must be 
a right to do scmething even when the majority thinks it would be 
wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for 
having it done. " 
The institution of rights is costly, therefore, in tenns of efficiency 
and utility, and requires a firm foundation (-we cannot simply assert, 
as Nozick does, that we have certain rights). Dworkin says that 
rights rest on the vague but powerful idea of human dignity or - which 
he seems to prefer - the idea of political equality: " to violate 
an i.rrportant right is a serious matter. It means treating a man as 
less than a man or as less worthy of concern than other men". 
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[Dworkin, 1977 : 198] But this is not obviously so. To be treated as 
utilitarian calculations dictate can be to be treated as an equal. It 
is. certainly not the case that one's interests have any less weight 
with the government than those of another. 
Is there not perhaps a possible conflict between the right to equal 
concern -which may or may not be satisfied by utilitarianism, and the 
right to equal respect - which suggests bowing to vague notions like 
dignity and autonomy even when "concern" pranpts one to interfere? 
Dworkin writes that: "It has becane cornron to describe the great 
social issues of domestic politics as presenting a conflict between 
the demands of liberty and equality." (11) This conflict has been 
responsible for a great deal of indetenninacy and inaction on the part 
of liberals and Dworkin's attempt to avoid it is creditable. He does 
so by denying as absurd the· idea of a general right to liberty, saying 
that the liberties we ought to have can be shown to be fundarrentally 
sanething else (scrrething nore canpatible with equality) and that 
other liberties are not intrinsically desirable and so should be given 
no special weight in utility calculations. 
He defines liberty as the absence of constraints placed by a 
government upon what a man might do if he wants to. He stresses that 
this is a non-moral definition - neutral between the liberty to steal 
and the liberty to say_what one wishes. 
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There seems to be no general right to liberty as such in the sense 
that if utility requires it, the goverrment is justified in limiting 
saneone' s liberty say, to drive in both directions on Iexington 
Avenue. He imagines his opponent res:ponding that what matters are not 
all liberties but important liberties. What makes them nore 
i.nportant, he asks? It cannot be simply that their loss causes nore 
frustration or limits future choice nore, because traffic rules do the 
fonrer and criminal laws the latter at least as much as restrictions 
on freerlorn of speech would. 
If it is the character rather than the degree of liberty which makes 
the difference: " ••. then the notion of a general right to liberty as 
such has been entirely abandoned. If we have a right to basic 
liberties, not because they are cases in which the CCJit'I[OO(li ty of 
liberty is somehow especially at stake, but because an assault on 
basic liberties injures or demeans us in ~way that goes beyond its 
i.npact on liberty, then what we have a right to is not liberty at all, 
but to the values or interests or standing that this particular 
constraint defeats." [Dworkin, 1977 : 271] 
His dismissal of liberty is too brief. Of course there is no general 
right to oomplete liberty, just as there is no general right to 
oomplete happiness, but what of the familiar idea of a right to the 
greatest liberty canpatible with ·a like systan of liberty for all? 
In choosing bebeen liberties one does not weigh the right to drive 




speech. One weighs the freedan to steal against the freedan to use 
one's possessions in security; the freedan to speak against the 
right not to be spoken about; and in each case one chooses the 
liberty which offers the widest choice. The lexington Avenue example 
is misguided. The power of the traffic department to make rules of 
the road which are largely arbitrary so increases one's freedan of 
movenent that it is a small sacrifice. Such rules certainly cause 
less frustration than would their absence. 
The idea then, of a right to equal concern and respect is central to 
IM:>rkin 's theory. This he interprets as the right to be treated as an 
equal in the peli tical decision about how goods and opportunities are 
to be distributed. Utilitarian calculations seem to do this: "to 
embody the fundamental right of equal concern and because they treat 
the wishes of each rrember of the conmunity on a par with the wishes of 
any other, with no bonus or discount reflecting the view that that 
:rrember is :rrore or less worthy of concern, or his views rrore or less 
worthy of respect than any other." [Dworkin, 1977 274] 
'Ib avoid imposing sane non-neutral standard, utility maximizers take 
the aim of giving citizens rrore of what they want. Utilitarian 
a.rgurrents fix on the fact that a particular constraint on liberty will 
make people happier. But people's overall preferences for one policy 
rather than another may be seen to include both preferences that are 
personal because they state a preference for the assignment of one set 
of goods or opportnnities to him, and preferences that are external, 
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because they state a preference for one assigmnent of goods and 
opporttmities to others." [Dworkin, 1977 : 275] 
'Ib allow external preferences to count, ~rkin says, will not respect 
the right of everyone to be treated with equal concern and respect. 
For instance, if many racists think blacks' preferences should count 
for less than whites' and this desire is taken into account and the 
blacks suffer: "then their own assigmnent of goods and opportunities 
will depend, not simply on c:orrpetition among personal preferences that 
abstract statements of utilitarianism suggest, but precisely on the· 
fact that they are thought less worthy of concern and respect than 
o~rs." [~rkin, 1977 : 275] 
The best way of determining and realizing people's wants is to allow 
them equal say in a d,em::)cratic forum. The derrocratic process, 
however, makes no distinction between personal and external 
preferences. Therefore, ~rkin suggests rights to protect those 
croices of a person in which external preferences are antecedently 
likely to be influential. 
H L A Hart doubts whether what is objectionable about counting 
external preferences is that it fails to treat people as equals 
[Ryan, 1979 : 92]. He denies that it does in fact treat people as 
unequal. Each person's preferences on any issue are taken to have 
equal -weight. If one person does not stand directly to lose or gain 
~ a particular decision, is it wrong to consider his desire, to 
prevent him fran casting his vote in favour of a friend? On issues of 
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sexual freedan, if everyone's external, as well as everyone's personal 
preferences are counted, nothing analogous to double counting occurs. 
Hart says that principles such as "Treat everyone as an equal" are 
indetenninate as they are satisfied both by "impose no scheme of 
values on anyone" and by "irrpose this particular scheme of values on 
everyone" (for argument's sake, one that no one wants). The objection 
seems to be rather that if hostile preferences are allowed to tip the 
balance, people may suffer or be deprived of liberty, not to bring 
about more good somewhere else but simply out of contempt or spite. 
"But this is a vice not of the mere externality of the preferences 
that have tipped the balance but of their content, i.e. their 
liberty-denying and respect-denying content." [Ryan, 1979 : 93] 
He continues, "It is fantastic to suppose that what, for example, 
those denied freedom of worship have chiefly to canplain about is not 
the restriction of their liberty with all its grave impact on personal 
life or developnent and happiness, but that they are not accorded 
equal concern and respect." [Ryan, 1979 :. 92] 
0\\urkin seems to be missing the mark in stressing quality here. The 
concern and respect themselves, are what are important and these can 
be maximized with no rrore or less inequality if people are guaranteed 
exclusive control over aspects of their 1i ves which are important to 
them but of little significance to others. 
A further objection raised by Hart is that to link rights so closely 
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to what decisions are antecendently likely to be affected by external 
pre~ces is to make rights depend on what prejudices are current in 
a particular society. · This is a strange and contingent foundation for 
rights. 
There seem to be some liberties which are too precious to be placed at 
the nercy of utilitarian calculation even purified of external 
preferences. For instance, if there were no antecedent likelihood of 
external preferences affecting freedcm of speech, should a person's 
right to speak free! y be restrained because his speech is like! y to 
jeopardize someone' s personal preference for money and security fran 
punishment? 
Dworkin's.project is to give rights a foundation which is not at cx:1ds 
with equal concern and respect. He writes: "I do wish to rrention one 
alleged right that might be called into question by my general 
argument, which is the supposed individual right to the free use of 
property •.. it is sometimes held that it is inconsistent for liberals 
to defend liberty of speech • • • and not also concede a parallel right 
of sane sort of property and its use. There might be force in that 
argument if the claim that we have a right of free speech depended on 
a right to something called liberty as such. But that general idea is 
tmtenable and incoherent; there is no such thing as any general right 
to liberty. The argument for one liberty nay therefore be entirely 
independent of the ~t for any other. I cannot think of any 
argument that a political decision to limit such a right in the way in 
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which minimum wage laws limited it, is antecendently likely to give 
effect to external preferences, and in that way offend the right of 
those whose liberty is curtailed to equal concern and respect. If, as 
I think, no such argument can be made out, then the alleged right does 
not exist." [Dworkin,. 1977 : 277] 
One nniSt assume then that lhAJrkin 'WOUld favour a thorough-going 
utilitarianism with regard to property. lbwever, I would disagree 
with ~ points in the quoted passage (which perhaps cancel each other 
out) • As we have seen Dworkin's basis for rights is perverse and the 
lack of such a basis for property rights does not necessarily mean 
they do not exist. 
On the other hand, even if one does affinn a general right to the 
maximum liberty possible, this does not uncontroversially support the 
right to own and dispose of property as one chooses. Such ownership 
and its protection limit the freedom of others. 
In the absence.of a presupposition in favour of the right to own 
property, however, the appropriate calculation may not be wholly 
utilitarian. There may be other rights to be taken into account. 
Private property may be the . best means of protecting other. rights such 
as rights to privacy and liberty of the person. A utility calculation 
may require a completely laissez-faire econany in which sane rnenbers 
of society suffer appalling hardships in order that others may 
prosper. IM:>rkin does not deal with these problems here. 
- 130 -
In two articles written in 1981 for PhilOSOphY and Public Affairs, 
~rkin appears to have changed or clarified his position. He ccmas 
up with a picture of social justice which cannot be equiyalent simply 
to maximizing overall utility. 
Again he starts with the premise of equal concern and respect but 
concludes that it is the business of goverrment to make its citizens 
equal in sane fundamental and neutral respect. He considers first the 
possibility of equality of welfare - either of conscious states or of 
satisfaction of desire, but finds it impossible to establish a neutral 
criterion of welfare since same people place less value on happiness 
than others do - preferring perhaps the realization of goals such as 
renown after death. The realization of goals -neutral between the 
goal of happiness and goals of bringing about some state of affairs, 
cannot be used since to ensure people chances of achieving their 
desires treats people unequally since sane prefer a great goal that 
they may never reach, while others are less ambitious. He writes: 
"Differences in people' s judgements about how their lives are going 
overall are differences in their lives, rather than simply differences 
in their beliefs, only when they are differences, not in fantasy or 
conviction, but in fulfilment which is, I take it, a matter of 
measuring personal success or failure against sare standard of what 
soould have been, not what conceivably might have been. If 'nle 
.irrq;x:>rtant comparison seems to me to be this. People have lives of 
less overall success if they have rrore reasonably to regret that they 
do not have or have not done." [Dworkin, 1981A : 2161 
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One cannot reasonably regret that one is not the richest, strongest, 
tallest person on earth but one can reasonably regret that one is 
~rse-off than average. '!his notion of reasonable regret seems to 
produce results very s.imi.lar to Rawls' difference principle. Although 
the principle advocates taking fran the rich to give to the poor, the 
rich cannot reasonably object whereas the ~rse-of could object to a 
system which made them ~rse-off than they might otherwise have been. 
One cannot reasonably regret, furthermore, if one starts out no 
worse-off than others and one wilfully destroys what one has or 
cultivates expensive tastes which mean one is less happy with one's 
share than are others. It seems unfair (an object for reasonable 
regret by others) if they are forced to give up part of their shares 
to c:::arpensate for one's wastefulness. 
Dworkin concludes that the appropriate dimension of equality is 
equality of resources. As a model procedure for reckoning the justice 
of a distribution Dworkin asks one to imagine that a mrrnber of 
shi~eck survivors are washed up on a desert island which has· 
abl.mdant resources and no native population and any likely rescue is 
many years away "These imnigrants accept the principle that no one is 
antecedently entitled to any of these resources but that they shall be 
divided equally among them." [Dworkin, 1981B : 285] 
To facilitate this division they hold an auction. Each inmigrant 
receives an equal number of clamshells and they bid for each separate 
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item on the island. The crucial features of this process are: that 
the immigrants start fran a position of equal bargaining power and 
that the value of resources is detennined by how much other people 
want them. The resulting distribution meets the envy test: no 
immigrant IDuld prefer anyone else's bundle to his own. 
In the first point he agrees with Rawls. 'Ibis is a roodel for an 
original structuring of principles of econanic justice: all 
individuals meet, assert their claims and have a chance to bargain, 
e.g. to agree to make concessions in other people's favour in exchange 
for reciprocal concessions. Such a marketplace is a valuable device 
for detennining what people want, how much they want it and ensuring 
~t in sane sense, they agree to what happens to them. If their 
bargaining ~r were unequal, as it must be in a real marketplace, 
then how Irn.lCh one is prepared to pay will cease to be an indicator of 
how much one wants sanething: and relatively trivial desires of the 
more fortunate will connt for more than the urgent needs of others. 
This is to treat one individual as more valuable than another. 
Dworkin's model is more modest than that of Rawls. He recognises that 
equality is a presupposition of his model and not a conclusion and, I 
think rightly, criticises Rawls for believing he can use the veil of 
ignorance to support equality. The i.rrmigrants distribute only 
resources and not rights and duties although they do discuss rules 
governing production, exchange and taxation. Dworkin's picture is 
less elegant than Rawls' , as he first imagines his intnigrants as 
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penniless but fully aware of their talents, handicaps and inclinations 
and then has to introduce ad hoc devices to deal with questions like 
cx:rcpensation for congenital blindness. He imagines the inmigrants 
adopting an insurance scheme. Whoever chose 'WOUld contribute to a 
fund and \\Ould be paid out in case of accidents. Such an insurance 
scheme is the foundation for taxation. "Taxation should be designed 
to match the situation in which everyone ~e as likely to develop a 
handicap and bought the average anount of insurance against that 
possibility." [I>\\Orkin, 1981B : 298] 
Even if the inunigrants started with equal shares, hard work, skill and 
luck \\Ould soon mean that shares becarre unequal. The way to deal with 
this Dworkin suggests, is to treat being stupid or weak on a par with 
being handicapped and develop an insurance scheme which would 
ccmpensate those who by chance failed to find remunerative work. How 
much people should contribute to such a scherre would be determined by 
calculating what people who had the same chance of being badly off 
\\Ould decide to contribute. The device is very similar to the 
original position but Dworkin's conclusions are less precise. He 
believes people \<.Ould not insure themselves against not earning a high 
salcuy since that ~uld mean they ~uld have a high chance of being 
enslaved to their jobs to pay the premimns. On the other hand, they 
would be alm::>st certain to insure thernsel ves against falling below a 
certain minimum since that possibility, however unlikely, would be 
intolerable. 
- 134 -
The envy test should be applied over time, however, so that no one 
prefers another's whole life. '!his means that if one person chooses 
to gamble his resources on a risky venture and wins or loses, or one 
person chooses to "WOrk hard for high gain and another to "WOrk very 
little but have a frugal life-style, these choices ought not to be 
penalized or rewarded. 
Taxation, he says, should atterrpt to neutralize the differential 
benefit brought about by unequal talents but should be 
ambition-sensitive, i.e. allow those who are prepared to "WOrk harder 
at less popular tasks or to take risks, to benefit. 
This reflects important underlying convictions that have long been 
associated with liberalism. The first is that government should be 
neutral between conceptions of the good life, that it should not bias 
its citizens in favour of or against lives of leisure or 
possessiveness or risk-aversion. Further it appears to make a 
distinction between choice and effort, on the one hand, for which one 
can be held responsible, and talents, and so on, which one cannot be 
said to deserve and from which one does not deserve to reap the 
benefits. In this latter point he differs fran Rawls who denies that 
one is responsible for how hard one tries. I feel it is an 
improvement since Rawls' line taken to its logical conclusion, leads 
to determinism. 
~rkin's idea, if it could be realized, 'WOuld resolve the 
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incentive/equality dilemna which disturbs utilitarians. People 'WOUld 
be enoouragecl to try hard and to use their skills effectively but 
their- rewards would differ as widely as their industriousness and not 
as widely as their abilities. 
The idea produces a society which is superior to Marx's in that it 
recognises that there must be some trade-off between pleasant work and 
socially useful work: and between using one's tine doing what one 
likes and using it getting what one wants. (By this I do not mean to 
suggest that all werk is unpleasant or that all leisure is fun). Marx 
appears to believe that all these desirable properties will ooincide 
in each person·• s work - one day, after the revolution and that 
therefore, there is no point in offering incentive to encourage people 
to do what is necessary. It is implausible to believe that in such 
circumstances if they are given the choice, people will opt to do 
unpleasant, hard work for no extra reward. It is more likely that 
they will be given no choice. 
It is doubtful, however, whether Dworkin's idea can be realized. He 
advocates simply sane fonn of progressive incane tax which does not 
level people off completely but reduces the differences between them. 
(Incane tax, he says, is preferable to consunption-tax or wealth-tax 
since it is not biased in favour either of those who spend or those 
who save.) However, it completely fails to recognise industry while 
neutralizing the effects of talent since the doctor who works fourteen 
hours a day saving lives and earns the same as a singer who has two 
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perfonnances a month is also taxed the same. A p:>ssible partial 
solution would be to tax earnings per hours worked rather than net 
incane. This might be slightly unfair to fast workers - or it could 
be c:x::xnbined with taxing net incane so that workers were not encouraged 
to work slowly although they were encouraged to work for longer hours. 
Another suggestion is to tax useful or unpleasant jobs such as rubbish 
collecting less than say, playing basketball. The trouble with this 
is that it is difficult to fonnulate criteria of "useful n without 
appearing to be non-neutral about the worthiness of activities and 
choices. It would be inadequate to define "useful" in tenns of how 
much people want it, and "unpleasant" in tenns ·of how many people are 
prepared to do it and allow the law of supply and demand to take care 
of the issue because the supply of rubbish collectors is more likely 
to :rreet the demand than is the supply of nuclear physicists and there 
is no reason to believe that the latter is less pleasant than the 
fonrer. 
Furtherrrore, talent and ambition are closely intertwined. r-bst 
talents are developed at the expense of hard work and long and 
expensive training. Natural talents often provide the incentive in 
the form of praise and intrinsic satisfaction, for one to work harder. 
Talent and social usefulness are even more closely intertwined. 
Society nn1st provide incentives, not only for people to work hard, but 
to use their most valuable talents. As a result, those who are 
fortunate enough to possess these talents are likely to benefit 
because of them. 
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Jan Narveson contends that special features of the island example 
prejudice the case. For instance: 
(1) Resources are fairly abundant on the island, so each share will 
be relatively attractive. This does not carpare well with the 
real. world where an equal share may be less than an individual 
needs for a fulfilled life. The significance of this fact is 
unclear since a similar criticism is levelled against I.Dcke, to 
the opposite effect: that in a situation of scarcity, one cannot 
allow uncontrolled individual appropriation but the camn.mity as 
a whole must regulate resources for their mutual advantage. 
(2) The island is relatively small and accessible. Narveson denies 
that we would feel the same way if the terri tory the inmigrants 
arrived at were vast and difficult to tame like Tasmania. He 
says the strong and fearless would be unlikely to accept an equal 
division of all potential land. Again, the force of this is 
difficult to detennine. If Narveson is imagining a territory so 
vast that if the adventurous imnigrants -were to strike out into 
the hinterland and carve out large territories for themselves, 
the weak and timid would be relatively unharmed, then his own 
first criticism cancels this out. If the -weak and timid would be 
left with less than they needed to survive because the strong 
\\ere able to take and keep the lion's share, then he is rrerel y 
asserting that might is right. 
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(3) The fact that the parties are imnigrants biases the case in 
favour of an equal division since a shipload of inmigrants is 
typically united in sane sort of co-operative enterprise. 
Narveson is equivocating here. The people on the island are only 
"imnigrants" in the sense that they have cane fran another 
country and will live on the island. There was no suggestion 
that they originally set out as a cohesive pioneering group. 
There is no necessity to suppose that they even knew each other 
before the wreck. 
(4) The auction takes place at a particular time with a particular 
set of resources. The results of the auction are sanehow -to be 
measured against current distributions in the real world to 
assess the justice of the latter. But can we ask at what time 
might the auction have been held and what would constitute the 
set of initial resources for the auction in question? It is not 
only not obvious that answers to either of those questions would 
not typically be non-arbitrarily available, but rrore nearly 
obvious that they would not .be typically so. [Narveson, 1983 
15] 
The island and the objects the imnigrants find on it represent all 
natural resources to which no one has any particular antecedent right. 
The fairest procedure is to divide these resources equally. But 
Dworkin himself denies_that one should continue redistributing and 
equalizing. Each individual is enti tied to any extra he can make for 
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himself by 'NOrking and saving. Nal:Veson 1 s objection is that it is 
:irrpossible to separate in a non-arbitrary way, natural resources fran 
the contribution people make to them. 
Further, the sort of redistributive neasures Ik.urkin envisions being 
set up 'NOuld be those which would be equivalent to the 'NOr kings of an 
insurance schetre chosen by a group of islanders who did not know 
whether they 'NOuld be handicapped or not or whether their talents 
'NOuld be of any value. "n:>es this really ensure equality of resources 
anyway? Does the poor, unemployed, untalented Smith who receives 
insurance benefits possess equal resources as Jones who is rich and 
talented even though taxed. One thing~ must bear in mind, for 
instance, is that the opportunity to participate in the insurance 
auction which underpins all this is pure! y hypothetical. The fact is 
that Smith is, in every measure that matters, way behind Jones in the 
actual 'NOrld. On Dworkin 1 s progranme, it looks as though equality 
only holds good in the hypothetical starting point rather than in the 
real "WOrld." [NaJ:Veson, 1983 : 18] 
For both Rawls and Ik.urkin, goverrurent must concern itself with 
creating as far as possible, conditions in which each can realize his 
conception of the good life, and it must be impartial in its dealings 
with these citizens. 
Equality is a slippery notion. Nozick 'NOU!d advocate treating 
citizens equally by demanding an equal (small} aiOOUD.t of tax fran each 
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and acting impartial! y to ensure that no one interfered with anyone 
else's natural or contracted rights. other writers demand equal 
opportunity so that all equally gifted persons have an equal chance of 
getting certain positions and their reward. Both Rawls and Dworkin 
reject such a meritocracy since it seeks to reward people for 
qualities they deserve no rrore than they deserve their skin colour or 
~ritance. 
If it is true that one does not deserve whatever holdings or abilities 
one happens to have (Nozick concedes this but asserts,) it does not 
follow that society as a whole owns and has a right to distribute or 
use these resources. It does mean, however, that the fact of one's 
physical possession cannot be an immoveable barrier to the realization 
of rrorally desirable states of affairs such as the relief of need, the 
diffusion of power, the abolition of degrading inequalities, the 
inprovement of opportunities. Of course, there might be similar 
considerations in particular cases, -weighing in favour of leaving 
holdings where they fall, such as the need for security and 
incentives. The point is that it cannot be sufficient justification 
for not redistributing a resource that the person happened to be born 
with it (at least where there are factors favouring redistribution). 
In virtue of what does one deserve sanething? In virtue, presumably, 
of one's character or conduct, at least those aspects of one's 
character or conduct for which one is responsible. One does not seem 
to deserve anything for one's beauty, but one may deserve saoothing 
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for one's courage. Nor does one seem to deserve a reward for saving 
scxreone' s life by tmintentionall y erilptying the cup of poison he would 
have dnmk. If one is similarly fortunate in inheriting a million one 
does not deserve this either. If one is successful as a result of 
having used one's brains, one does not seem to deserve the full 
reward. Here Rawls and I:M:>rkin agree. Where they disagree is over 
the question of whether one desel:Ves a reward for success which is 
purely the result of hard work. 
I think it is misguided to deny that ·one is responsible for the 
cmices one makes unless one is prepared to deny autonomy and nnrality 
altogether and this is a dangerous line to take if one's theory rests 
largely on the belief in the-freedom and rationality of individuals. 
It is not misguided to deny that one is responsible for the influence 
of arbitrary factors on how one's intentions turn out. 
Rawls says that: "The two principles are equivalent to an undertaking 
to regard the distribution of natural abilities as a collective asset 
so that the IOC>re fortunate are to benefit only in ways that help those 
who have lost out .•• By arranging inequalities for reciprocal advantage 
the exploitation of the contingencies of natural and social 
circumstances within a framework of equal liberty, persons express 
their respect for one another in the very constitution of their 
society." [179] 
Phrases like "the nnre fortunate", "those who have lost out", "persons 
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express their respect for one another", suggest that Rawls has a 
conception of the individual as a colourless nora! agent to which 
characteristics are added like possessions. Dworkin drives a similar 
wedge between the person and his properties although he doesn't 
imagine persons neeting without their properties. In discussing how 
one ought to regard expensive tastes, he explici t1 y draws a line 
bebam the person with his conception of the good, and the varioo.s 
facts about him which facilitate or impede his success. 
Nozick and Narveson are nervous of making this distinction. If one 
takes this line, they believe, it is only squeamishness and technical 
difficulties which prevent one transplanting limbs and forcing people 
to work. In principle there seans to be no reason why their argurrent 
soouldn' t allow this. Both Rawls and Dworkin invoke rights of 
inviolability of the person, but are one's organs really part of one's 
person on this 'thin' conception of the individual? Of course, one 
cannot rerrove organs or force someone to work without also interfering 
with the person (in whatever sense) but it IPaY be replied that people 
who do not give their body parts or tirre voluntarily are behaving as 
unjustly as those who evade paying taxes and, as such, can justly be 
punished. Nozick thinks there is little difference but draws opp:>site 
conclusions. 
Hart describes his position: "Nozick thinks that taxing earnings or 
profits for the relief of poverty or the general -welfare such as 
public education is on this view norally indefensible; it is said to 
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be on a par with forced labour or making the government imposing such 
taxes into part owners of the persons taxed." [Ryan, 1979 : 82] 
The idea seems to be: if my talents (labour) are mine and I exchange 
them for X, then X becares mine in the same sense. Only if my talents 
are not mine can I be said not to deserve or own (in the moral sense) 
my payment. But if my talents are not mine then others are not 
obliged to refrain from using them as a carmon resource. 
It is an unpleasant dilemma as it appears to force one to choose 
between a ruthless laissez-faire economy and an appallingly 
totalitarian society. The response is perhaps to take a utili tar ian 
line that redistribution is justified when it improves people's 
well-being (perhaps with a special weighting for equality) and that 
persons are relatively protected against forced organ transplants 
since: 
(1) it seems usually to be the case that people get better use out of 
their own lx>dy parts than others \>K>uld. 
(2) the disutility of being operated upon is so great. 
(3) the anxiety created by the existence of such a system produces 
further disutili ty 
so that it is probably best to adopt a convention ensuring the 
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inviolability of persons, in the same way that, the institution of the 
family, although preventing equality of opportunity, is an institution 
of such value that it is worth keeping in spite of the cost. It may, 
however, be the case, that sanetimes the inviolability of persons is 
ou~ighed by other claims. This will be unpleasant but presumably 
the alternative will be even trore so. 
sane notion of equality would be agreed to by m::>st people. "Equality 
·before the law", for instance. This is the assertion that governments 
or other public institutions should treat citizens impartially, should 
distribute equally what they have to distribute. But this notion of 
equality has no obvious consequences as to what distributions should 
be realized since there is no clarity or agreement on what the 
govermnent ought to have to distribute, to whan and in virtue of what 
(i.e. a university distributes places and degrees to students in 
virtue of their different degrees of intelligence and industry). 
Should a government treat its citizens' talents as something for which 
to reward them or as something for which to CCJY!l=ensate the others? If 
there is a blanket assumption that individuals as they really are, are 
the same then their different talents etc will be treated as different 
am:>unts of good luck. If there is a further asstnnption that they are 
equally valuable to the ccmrunity, the difference principle or sane 
m::>re egalitarian distribution will result. 
If we adopt as a starting point scm:thing like "Each is to count for 
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one" or "the goverrnrent ought to treat citizens as equals" we then 
have to agree on what persons are and what they all consider of 
fundamental importance, since to treat persons as equals in one 
dimension will involve treating them unequally in another. In a 
simple, obvious example, ensuring equal opportunity for all requires 
resources and taxation may take an equal am::runt of each's earnings or 
may leave each with the same amount. 
Equality therefore is an anibivalent ideal. If it is valuable, perhaps 
the 'lm.derlying basis of its value may indicate which dimension 'WOUld 
be the rrost appropriate. 
Some theorists use the tenninology of a race. The goverrnrent must 
ensure fair c:orcpetition. On this conception of human activity the 
standard for assessing one's life is haw it compares with the lives of 
others. This is the only conception which could justify absolute 
equality as an end in itself. But this seems to be a bad IOOdel. 
Firstly, there are other criteria for assessing one's life: whether 
one is healthy, well-nourished, canfortable, stimulated, satisfied by 
the nature of one's work, loved, unburdened by guilt. Although one 
does sometimes measure one's well-being against that of others: 
(1) relative well-being arguably might and perhaps ought to be less 
significant than real well-being 
( 2) there are too many dimensions, many of which are incomnensurable 
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for life to be described as a single race 
(3) the rrost deeply felt source of envy is usually another's 
· intelligence, beauty, rroral superiority, loveableness, rather 
than his superior wealth, which can be redistributed, and rroney 
cannot conpensate for a sense of inferiority based upon the fact 
of inferiority. 
Of course, people do carpete for things such as possessions and power 
and if these are what are ultimately valuable and there is an 
invariable a~rou:nt of these, it may be appropriate to share them out 
equally. If, however, the smn of these resources varies with the 
nature of their distribution, other strategies may be appropriate. It 
is undoubtedly the case that distribution affects the net arrou:nt of 
material goods. If the more efficient control rrost rreans of 
production, for instance, they will be :rrost productive. "Control" 
does not mean "own" however, and it is perhaps possible to separate 
the useful fran the hannful aspects of control. But incentives of 
material gain play an important r8le in generating extra resources. 
This is of course an empirical point, but, I think, a very plausible 
one. utilitarianism recognises that inequality can increase the 
a~rou:nt of material goods. On the other hand, since rrost goods produce 
a diminishing marginal utility, inequality decreases their val1,1e. The 
two considerations have to be finely balanced. 
It is objected against utilitarianism that it treats persons simply as 
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measure of utility. What average utilitarianism does is give each 
person an equal chance of getting the greatest amount of welfare. But 
the fact that before one entered life one had a good and equal chance 
of getting sanething does not in any way ccmpensate one for not having 
it in real life; the· equality of antecedent or hypothetical 
probability does not reconcile one to actual inequality which has 
unpleasant real (as opposed to relative) cons8:IlJ.ences. 
If Rawls' Difference Principle is realized no-one has less than each 
would have had if evecything was divided equal! y am::mgst them. This 
means that no-one is sacrificed for anyone else which captures the 
notion of the separateness of persons. At the same time it recognises 
that what people \'mlt is not so much to be equal as to be as well-off 
as possible. 
The emphasis on equal opJ;X>rtuni ty is very valuable not rrerel y as an 
equal chance to be well paid but as an equal chance to develop to 
one's full potential. To have an education which brings out one's 
talents and a career which uses them is satisfying whatever one's 
talents are. It is also the best way of discovering and utilizing all 
skill available to the camrnunity. 
CCNCLUSION 
I have grouped together Ryan's utilitarianism and the theories of two 
revisionist liberals, Rawls and Dworkin and called them hybrid 
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theorists because they all seem to recognise the pi tfa11s of extrerre 
libertarian and socialist positions. Their theories are roughly 
neutral between systans of private and carrmm property and suggest 
incorporating features of both but remaining sensitive to conditions 
and they are prepared to opt for whatever will raise the general 
standard of living while protecting individuals. 
Footnotes to Chapter V 
1. Fran Hutchinson, An Inquiry Concerning Moral C'..ocx:l. and Evil 
(1925), Chapter 3, paragraph 8 - said to be the earliest 
formulation of the utilitarianism principle. 
2. Alan Ryan elaborates on this (1984 98) 
" if the pleasures of anticipation are sweet, the pains of 
disappointed expectations are particularly severe. There are 
many things which we should not much miss if we never had than, 
which we should very much miss if we had had them and had lost 
them • 
• • • One of the things on which alrrost all utilitarians, other 
·than utopians like Codwin, agree is that there is an asymnetry 
between gains and losses: losses do not simply leave us where we 
were before, but make us much \\Orse off.". 
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3. Isaiah Berlin writes in a similar vein: 
"To avoid glaring inequality or widespread misery I am ready to 
sacrifice sane, or all of my freedom: I may do so willingly and 
freely: but it is freedom that I am giving up for the sake of 
justice or equality or the love of my fellow men. I should be 
guilt-stricken, and rightly so, if I -were not, in sane 
circumstances, ready to make this sacrifice. But a sacrifice is 
not an increase in what is being sacrificed, namely freedan, 
however great the noral need or the carpensation for it. 
Everything is what it is: not equated on fairness or justice or 
culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience • • • it is a 
confusion of values to say that although my 'liberal', individual 
freedom may go by the board, sane other kind of freedan -
'social' or 'econanic' -is increased.". (Berlin, 1969 : 125-6) 
4. It is interesting to note the effects of different nodels. 




Full ownership is distinguished fran :rrere physical possession. The 
concept of "ownership"· entails scme or all of the following: the 
right to exclude others, the right to decide how and by whan one's 
property may be used, the right to set conditions on how it may be 
used after one's death and to demand whatever price one likes in 
exchange for those rights. The essential ~lement to this is the 
absence of rights in others to use the thing without one's consent. 
One way to justify IT\Y right to exclude, say Jones fran a patch land he 
previously had a right to use, is to say that he gave up that right to 
me. For instance, he gave me the patch or his share in it. 
In this case Jones either owned or part owned the patch. In giving it 
to me, he transferred not only the right to exclude him but also the 
right to exclude others. How does this exclusivity cane about in the 
first place? Does the right to exclude the rest of htut'al1ity fran 
sanething require their consent either to a particular case or to sane 
general procedure of a<X,IUisition? Actual consent is :impossible to 
obtain and it seems to be the case that sane system of exclusive 
. rights is necessary (if only rights to exclusive use for a short 
period). However, although roost people, except anarchists, accept 
that any rules are better than none, of the possible schemata for 
property rights and procedures of acquisition which we might adopt it 
is a matter of ve:ry great significance which we do adopt. 
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It is there~re inadequate to adopt a laissez-faire acceptance of 
current distribution and allow current holders to do as they wish with 
what they own. {This appears to be Nozick' s solution although he adds 
the proviso that where any current holder has gained his possessions 
by ~roe. or fraud, the situation should be rectified). Although this 
would provide a set of rules regarding property - so avoiding anarchy 
- and would do so with as 1i ttle trouble as possible - it would not 
necessarily be the best principle fran an objective point of view {the 
most likely to maximize utility or to recognise people's rights) and 
it would certainly not receive the willing cooperation of all 
individuals involved. 
Since property entails the absence of rights of access in individuals 
who, in a state of nature or in another system, would have had these 
rights, the institution of property which is adopted must be such that 
it is to their mutual advantage so that they ~d have given up their 
rights if they could have been asked. 'Ihis fonn of justification for 
limitations of natural rights by the state was established by 
Classical Social Contract theorists. 
In a putative state of nature persons must have had equal rights to 
use all things since: 
1. They were free to act as they pleased. 
2. Physical objects had no rights. 
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3. If they ~e to have the future right to own, they must 
first have had the rights to use, to work on, and to occupy 
the land and natural resources they encountered. 
If the imposition of property rights was to obtain the consent of such 
persons it had to ensure each an acceptable carpmsation. At first 
glance, it appears that each of such persons should accept no less 
than an equal share. 
However, much research in the empirical social sciences suggests that 
the sum of all there is varies according to how it is distributed. If 
an individual can improve his lot by accepting that others are even 
better off than he, it seems rational for him to do so. It is just, 
therefore, for a society to adopt as a priority the maintenance of the 
\\Orst off at a certain level. Theoretically, this level should be: 
no less than they would have under a more egalitarian system - which 
may, in practice, best be instituted by ensuring that they have the 
· food, health care, housing that they need and access to educational 
facilities where the society is sufficiently affluent. Beyond this, 
it seems just to allow inequalities which are necessary to induce 
people to \\Ork to increase the average standard of living. Hayek, 
Rawls, Dworkin and Marx all claim that their systems will secure a 
minimum standard of living for all. They disagree as to how this will 
be best praroted and, if it turns out, that in fact their system does 
not secure it they disagree in whether this counts as a reason for 
abandoning their systan. For Rawls and Dworkin this seems to be one 
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of the forem:>st criteria for assessing an econany. 
One of the ways in which it might be possible to increase the sum, and 
so each share, of resources, is to allow these resources to be 
controlled by the most astute and motivated people. Democratic 
control of productive enterprises is far less likely to be efficient 
and there is sul:etantial evidence to support the belief that workers 
do not want it - especially at the cost of material hardship [Ryan, 
1984: Chap 7]. 
Furthenrore, people tend to work harder if they have reason to believe 
that their extra effort will make a difference to themselves and their 
families. Of course, they may also work hard under threat of 
punishment but the "carrot" approach seems more conducive to goodwill 
and freedan since it is easier to refuse a reward, (as long as one is 
ensured a minirm.ml wage) than to ignore a punishment. 
The negative effects of these institutions can be counteracted bY 
placing strict checks on the control managers have. For instance, by 
minimum wage laws and other laws governing employment and monopoly 
laws, by making managers liable to owners and trade unions and by 
separating the rights to own and receive incare on shares fran the 
right to manage. The adverse effects of differential income (as 
incentive) can be partially counteracted by instituting a harsh death 
tax and a steeply graduated incane tax. r-bst of these measure are the 
subjects of controversy. I suggest them here as a means of treating 
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individuals with equal concern and respect, on the conception of 
equality I consider nnst reasonable: that of maximizing the chances 
of each to have as many resources as possible without making the \\Orst 
off \\Orse off than they need be. 
Increasing econanic efficiency and prcxiuctivity is saneti.rres accused 
of being a materialistic goal which merely attempts to make palatable 
an essentially unjust and unfree systan. '!his seems to me to be 
mistaken.· Although \\Ork can or should be in part a means of self 
expression, development and pleasure, it is first and foremost a means 
of providing oneself with food, shelter and whatever else one 
considers necessary. For any state which concerns itself with the 
welfare of its citizens, provision of such necessities must take 
priority. There is no reason to believe that work done to provide 
these will be stimulating or pleasurable. If they can be produced 
with ease, individuals will be left free to pursue activities which 
are intrinsically satisfying: such as learning new skills, 
collaborating with others in projects to improve the envirorunent, 
hobbies, sport, reading or experimentation. Serre of these options may 
be available within the context of work but they will only be certain 
and nunerous if there exists an efficient econcmy producing the 
necessities of life. 'Ihl.s freedcm fran physical necessity is desired 
by both.liberals and socialists. 
A different criticism j..s that such a system necessarily involves 
continual interference with liberty; that people are not free to do 
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what they like with what they own or to make contracts as it suits 
them. However there is no reason to suppose that people ought to 
"own" things in this sense. It may be a restriction on It¥ freedan 
that I cannot destroy the home I have on 99-year lease or sell an 
official position I hold or plant turnips in a park but these are 
legitimate restrictions. It may be objected that these particular 
restrictions are established by the tenns of a contract to which I 
have agreed but any system of prOperty requires same sort of 
underlying contract and the nnst just contract may be one which places 
restrictions on hannful uses or accumulations of property. It is 
invariably the case that same freedans have to be restricted in order 
that others may be protected. If one is free to do as one wishes with 
certain things it means that others are forbidden to use these things. 
Alternatively, if everyone is pennitted to use something, everyone is 
severe! y restricted in the kinds of use they may make of that thing. 
The freedan to accumulate territory the size of Natal, or ten houses 
one leaves unoccupied seems to be a less valuable freedan to protect 
than independence or the chance to make a choice between reasonable 
careers and lifestyles. Where these freedans are mutually exclusive 
it seems appropriate to opt for the latter group. 
On the other hand private property rights, which give one the freedan 
to do as one likes with one's IX'ssessions became extremely valuable in 
areas where it is important that things reflect one's personality: 
for instance one's heme, clothes, garden. They ensure that one may 
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m:xlify these as one desires without canprcmise (except where one 
directly banns others) and so encourage individuality. They create a 
sense of security in that they protect one against the whims of others 
and increase the certainty one has regarding one's future and how one 
may affect it: one knows for instance that one will be allowed to 
enjoy the fann one cultivates. One also knCMS that no matter how 
eccentric one is, no one else can use political or econanic power to 
induce one to change. 
However, if private property is justified on the grounds of protection 
of individual rights, it cannot simply be the full liberal notion of 
property. As far as possible everyone should have sare property and 
no one person or group should be allowed to nonopolize too much 
property and the power it represents. C. B. Macpherson makes the 
distinction be~n self developnental and extractive powers. '!he 
first is the freedom and opportunity to develop and use one's talents; 
the second the capacity Dbrcibly to transfer another's powers [C.B. 
Macpherson, 1973: 10]. '!he first is desirable, the second is not. 
A legal system should maximize the freedan of its citizens but should 
not be indifferent to its distribution - citizens should not be 
all~ the freedan to abuse or exploit each other. This goal can be 
approached by insuring a rniniinum standard of living for all. If 
people have the necessities of life, they are less vulnerable to the 
abuse of econanic power than they are in a canpletel y laissez-faire 
econany. For instance, they cannot be forced to "WOrk for long hours 
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in apPa.lling conditions for survival wages. 
Such aid requires resources. A graduated incane tax supplies such 
resources at the same tim:! as it makes it extrenely difficult for any 
individual to accumulate vast sums (the means perhaps, to buy people 
or to manipulate the economy) • Individuals are further prevented fran 
·accumulating excessive amounts of Il'Oney and market freedans are 
protected if the state prevents certain transactions such as price 
fixing and bequeathal. 
I have tried to show that a free society is one which attempts to 
prevent individual holdings falling below a certain minimum or rising 
above a certain maximum that in each case where an econanic freedan is 
restricted in this system, it is restricted for the sake of greater 
freedcm: and that these conclusions are roughly co-extensive with the 
requirenents of equality as I have described them. 
It may be objected that this is unjust, since in practice it will 
maintain a pattern which is indifferent to the "-''rthiness of 
individuals. 
To treat people justly is, on a very natural conception, to give them 
what they deserve. Desert involves a peculiar rnixture of worthiness 
of the recipient and consent of all concerned parties. For instance, 
if I paint saneone's house without his consent, I do not deserve 
~nt. The winner of a tennis or poker game deserves his winnings 
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because he has met the conditions agreed to by the participants. 
Both aspects presuppose antecedent property rights and so have little 
to contribute to detennining the justices of the original 
establishment of rights. If I deserve sarething because its previous 
owner decided I was \\Orthy, the question remains: on what was his 
ownership based? If I deserve it in a rrore objective sense {i.e. I 
have done the rrost good) it may still be asked, what part of my 
contribution was due to me and what part to my good luck in the 
resources I had available? 
If property rights are antecedent to desert one should either abandon 
justice as a criterion or adopt a different conception of justice. 
John Rawls rejects justice as desert for similar reasons. He says 
what one deserves depends largely on the society's basic structure of 
values and principles for distributing rights and duties. To assess 
the justice of basic structures themselves he suggests justice as 
fairness. He writes "the principles of justice are the principles 
that free and rational persons concerned to further their own 
interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining 
the ftmdamental tenns of their association". (Rawls, 1972: 11) . 
I am uncertain whether this is the only possible alternative to the 
rejected notion of justice, or whether it is the best. However it has 
becane apparent that justice does not clearly indicate one fonn of 
property rather than another. Property rights are not natural rights. 
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They are instrumental to the protection of other rights or the 
maximization of utility. 'Ihey are thus contingent on circumstances. 
However, it may be unjust to confiscate a man's property or suddenly 
to disappoint his expectations regarding it. Justice, on any 
conception, appears to involve an element of constancy of treating 
people according to the tenns they have actually or tacitly agreed to 
and have been premised. Changes in structures of rights should occur 
slowly and with advance warning. If this is impossible, every effort 
should be made to canpensate those who lose out. 
Compensation could perhaps be paid out of a canpulsory insurance 
scheme. 
Tl').ese principles appear relatively innocuous, but if they are taken to 
their logical conclusions they produce sane seemingly 
counter-intuitive consequences. 
If a particular distribution and set of rules regarding property is 
justified because of the hypothetical consent it would receive, it 
must be the case that each person receives an equal share or sanething 
nore than an equal share if things are divided unequally. If persons 
have an equal claim on resources, then the fact of having been born 
earlier should not be all~ to give sareone an unfair advantage. 
That is, children have the same right to scroo share of resources as 
members of earlier gen~rations. There is no guarantee that this right 
will be fulfilled by parents. Sane parents are incanpetent, sane are 
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indifferent and so on. These parents, if they have been lazy, 
wasteful, reckless or feckless, may be said to deserve their 
unfortlmate position, but the children do not deserve theirs. It may 
also be said that hardworking parents or parents who have chosen to 
have small families deserve the chance to benefit their children (this 
is often their main purpose in working) but if a son's right to his 
land is based entirely on his father's rights and a great-grandson's 
rights on his great-grandfather's rights, then the rights created by 
the original acquisition imply the rights to control into perpetuity. 
This is implausible. If Dworkin's inmigrants arriving on the island 
discovered that scrneone had lived and died there three hundred years 
before and that that person had left a will stating that nine-tenths 
of the island be maintained as a shrine uninhabited and uncultivated 
forever, the inmigrants would seem to be justified in disregarding the 
claim. I am not denying that the living ever have duties to the dead 
- just that the example suggests that earning or finding sarething 
does not seem to entitle one to control what happens to it much after 
one's death - if the son does not deserve his disproportionately large 
inheritance and his father does not have a right to control what 
happens to his possessions after he is dead, this suggests that much 
of his property ought to be redistributed after his death. Especially 
since the responsibility for children rests with the state if parents 
fail to fulfil it. If such parents have numeroUs children, the state 
is faced with a dilemna: to provide extra Iredical and educational and 
other resources to large families -which seems unfair to other 
families; or to allot an equal share to each family: which is unfair 
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to the children of the large families who are not responsible for 
their parents' excesses. It seems right, therefore, that the state 
should have sane rights or authority in the matter of children: such 
as l.imi ting the number of children a couple may have or instituting a 
licence for parents. · 
Secondly, if redistribution is justified on the grounds that all 
people have an equal claim on resources based on their natural rights, 
it is :ilrplausible that such redistribution should be confined to the 
citizens of a single country. The rights of nations to exclusive 
control of their territories rest on similar grounds to the claims of 
individuals; de facto physical control, length of original occupancy 
or developnent by labour, which do not seem sufficiently powerful to 
override need. Narveson (1983} uses this as alnost a reductio ad 
absurdum of redistribution within countries. His a.rgurrent proves only 
that it is inconsistent to propose such redistribution while 
maintaining national selfishness. 
Thirdly, and most significantly, it has beccme apparent in the course 
of this discussion that it is alloost impossible to draw a clear line 
between a person and his property or between personal and property 
rights, sane writers see property as an extension of one's self. If 
one has made it, one has "mixed in" sane of one's labour and 
individuality. If one has bought it, one has exchanged it for a 
service or something one made. Many objects extend one's powers in 
the way improved limbs or intelligence would. Education is a gcx:xl 
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example. One acquires it frcm the external world {often at the 
expense of others) and yet it cannot physically or descriptively be 
separated from one's natural talents. One cannot be said to deserve 
the superior education one received or the high salary it enables one 
to ccmnand. One does not sean to deserve one's natural abilities any 
more. Again one is faced with a dilerrma: to allow people full 
freedan in their use of their time and abilities and to allow them 
rights over whatever they create with these abilities or whatever 
others are prepared to pay for their services. . Alternatively, we can 
abandon the absolute inviolability of the self. This is not to say 
that -we must treat property and persons with the same {as much or as 
little) respect. It may be more appropriate to adopt a sliding scale 
of defeasibili ty to match the sliding scale of distance the object or 
faculty stands fran one's identity. 
These dilermnas illustrate and underline a fundamental difficulty one 
encounters in drawing up principles of social justice. People have 
objects, abilities and territories, which have been given to them by 
their parents, by chance, in exchange for hard work, or in accordance 
with principles of social justice. Justice, security and freedom 
require that at least some of these holdings be protected and that 
owners have the right to decide what happens to them. At the sarre 
time, people have needs which are often legitima.te claims on the 
state. To satisfy these needs the state must confiscate part of 
others' holdings or interfere with their use. To respect and protect 
the rights of owners is to ignore and often actively to thwart, the 
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claims of the needy. The necessary trade-off be~ these two goals 
means that it is impossible to draw up a fully satisfactory progranme 
of econanic justice. Sane campranises are better than others. I have 
attarpted to give a broad outline of a system which avoids the 
pitfalls of either extreme. 
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